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The rapid increase in immigration (legal and illegal) to some Caribbean countries has had 
an enormous im pact on the island’s physical and social infrastructures which support the economies. 
The small island ecosystems, in particular, are particularly fragile and sensitive to drastic 
immigration increases. Also the Archipelagoes are vulnerable to covert entry o f undocumented 
workers.
Caribbean governments experience a high cost o f  delivery services to satisfy the basic needs 
o f these migrants, especially the undocumented ones. Indeed, direct consequences can be identified, 
not only for the demographic profile o f the population, but also for the social sectors, particularly 
education, housing, and health.
Given the complex nature o f the causes and consequences, the situation places a pressure 
on the political directorate to devise appropriate intervention policies and programmes. On the other 
hand, the lack o f  reliable data on the subject poses constraints on efforts by policy makers to conduct 
the kinds o f analyses required for accurate decision making.
This study presents a systematic analysis o f the impact o f immigration on small islands and 
coastal states. The aim is to provide policy makers with the appropriate data and analysis needed 
to assist in their decision making and problem solving. The study includes: (a) An assessment o f 
data availability on immigrants (legal and illegal); (b) Analysis o f  the social, demographic and 
economic characteristics o f immigrants; and (c) Identification o f  the impact o f excessive 
immigration on the demographic profile o f the population and the social sectors, with emphasis on 
the education, housing health and employment sectors.
This study responds to the recommendations contained in page thirteen o f the Caribbean 
Plan o f  Action - Follow-up to ICPD  ( otherwise known as the Bahamas consensus). Funding was 
provided by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) through the regional project 
CAJR/97/P07, executed by the Demography Unit, ECLAC, Subregional Headquarters for the 
Caribbean, Port o f  Spain.

THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION 
ON CARIBBEAN MICROSTATES 
Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Saint Maarten, 
United States Virgin Islands
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The surge in international migration in the 1970s and 1980s forms the basis for the prediction 
that the last decade o f  the twentieth century and the first decade o f the twenty-first century will be 
aptly named the Age o f  Migration. The large-scale movements o f  migrant labour are characterized 
by new forms and an increasing ethnic diversity, and are associated with the fundamental 
transformations in economic, social and political structures in the post-Cold War era. These 
movements not only affect the migrants themselves, but also exert impacts on both the sending and 
receiving societies.
During the latter half o f this century, the migration culture o f  the Caribbean has been 
distinguished by the extraregional movement o f  some 5.6 million migrants to North America and 
Europe. At the same time, there has been a rising tide o f intra-Caribbean migration with a focus on 
the receiving countries o f  the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, 
Saint Maarten, the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Virgin Islands o f the United States.
Conditions which have stimulated and extended migratory labour movements to intra- 
Caribbean destinations in the latter half o f  the twentieth century include the following:
• The retreat o f  the colonial powers from the region and the rise o f  independent states;
The retention o f race and class structures in the post-colonial era and the urge for 
upward socioeconomic mobility o f the masses;
The decline o f agriculture, the creation o f large labour surpluses, and the pressures 
to seek employment externally;
Regional economic recession and the widening economic inequalities between the 
haves and have-nots, both internally and externally;
• The collapse o f capitalist Cuba as a destination for North American and European 
tourists, the emergence o f  Caribbean islands as tourist attractions, the combination 
o f  resources— white sand, tranquil azure bays, vacation hotels and appropriate 
infrastructure— in some microstates which transformed them into tourist destinations 
w ith a concomitant demand for cheap labour;
• The advent o f  je t travel that became affordable to many potential migrants; and
The archipelagic nature o f several o f the tourist destinations which rendered them 
easy targets for undocum ented migration.
W hile the foregoing speak to the conditions which sustained the m igration culture o f the 
Caribbean, they do not explain what actually causes migration.
The causes of migration
Social scientists generally agree that the following five factors constitute the major causes 
o f  international migration:
i. The prim ary stim ulus o f  migration is the political and economic conditions o f  the 
receiving country. The political circumstances establish criteria for entry— such as 
the source o f  labour, the required entry documents, the length o f  stay, migrant status 
during the non-im m igrant period and thereafter, and the type o f  incorporation. The 
performance o f  the economy determines whether there w ill be active labour 
recruitm ent or self-propelled movement, the types o f  labour skills required, the 
num ber o f  im m igrants that can be absorbed, and patterns o f  settlement. These are 
often referred to as pu ll factors.
ii. Conditions in migrant-sending countries push the long-term  unemployed or 
underem ployed into a state as potential migrants. Low wages, job  insecurity, and 
political victim ization extend the need for an improvement in the quality o f life. 
M oreover, global economic restructuring since 1950 has served to shift jobs from 
agriculture to the m ore productive industry and service sectors.
iii. Currency is now given to the concept o f relative deprivation in the sending countries. 
This refers to the feelings o f deprivation arising from racial, social and economic 
inequalities w ithin society. These feelings increase as the number o f persons 
experiencing it in the referent group becomes large.
iv. Networking and linkages provide the indispensable connection between the (battery) 
poles o f  push and pull factors. Without these networks, m igration will not take place. 
N etworks include the factors that inform o f the opportunities abroad and how to take 
advantage o f  them. The most important o f these are family and friends already 
abroad who supply credible information about the jobs, opportunities, how to get 
there, immediate living arrangements, and wages. The communications 
revolution— in the telephone, postal links and television— and the transportation 
revolution— lowered cost o f travel to more locations and the international network 
o f  flights— add to the ease with which potential migrants become actual migrants.
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v. The iron law o f  labour immigration asserts that there is nothing more permanent than
tem porary workers— documented or undocumented. The intent o f temporary 
migration, which forms the basis o f most international labour movement, proves 
sterile in the face o f contemporary rights-based politics o f the receiving countries. 
M igrants are aware that if  one cannot get into the front door legally, then entry 
through the side door or even the back door has the same outcome— permanent stay 
in the migrant-receiving country.
Impacts of immigration on Caribbean receiving countries
The consequences o f immigration on microstates tend to be exaggerated when compared to 
the effects on industrial métropoles. The impacts on the former are more dramatic and more sudden, 
and they tend to evoke far stronger reactions from nationals as well. This response is in most 
instances generated by the racial, ethnic, cultural or linguistic differences o f the foreigners. These 
traits also determine the seuil de tolérance— threshold o f toleration— which tends to be reached 
sooner in the smallest countries1.
Four Caribbean microstates which are significantly impacted by immigration and which are 
the core o f  this report are the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands (BVI), Saint Maarten and the 
Virgin Islands o f the United States (USVI). These microstates are distinguished by economies 
which are based prim arily on tourism, by per capita income levels that are among the highest in the 
region, by the need for various proportions o f foreign labour to sustain the growth o f their 
economies, and by native populations who are all desirous o f controlling the extent to which their 
homelands seem to be threatened by outsiders.
The major areas o f impact are demographic, economic, social, political and cultural. 
Primary areas of impact
I. Demographic
Population growth
• M uch o f the recent population growth in these countries is attributable to
immigration.
• The m ost significant growth occurred in Saint Maarten and the least in the
Bahamas— in relative terms.
'■It is instructive that the current heated debate concerning immigration in the United States is 
occurring at a time when the immigrant stock is a mere eight per cent of the total population.
Saint M aarten recorded population increases o f  186 per cent between 1960 andl 972, 
68 per cent from 1972 to 1981, and 145 per cent between 1981 and 1992. The 
censuses o f  1992 showed that it had the highest percentage o f  immigrant (non­
national) stock: 54 per cent.
The population o f the US VI grew by 95 per cent between 1970 and 1980, and the 
total set o f  immigrants, and in-migrants (from the United States and Puerto Rico) 
caused natives to be a minority in their homeland.
The BVI grew by 47 per cent from 1980 to 1991. In the latter year, half o f its 
population were non-belongers.
The Bahamas experienced the smallest overall population increase during this 
period— nine per cent were non-nationals, mainly o f Haitian origin.
Sex composition
The fém inisation o f  the migrant stream that characterizes the labour movement in 
Latin America and the Caribbean is only partially evident in the four selected 
countries.
Census data in recent years show that males dominate the immigrant flow into the 
Bahamas and the BVI, and females into Saint M aarten and the USVI.
The predominance o f  one sex is an indication o f  the types o f  labour niches that are 
being filled— more males suggest heavier work such as manufacturing and 
construction; and more females imply light industrial, hotel, restaurant, and domestic 
service jobs.
One dominant sex indicates that immigrants are not moving with their spouses or 
families, and they will ultimately select mates from among, and have children with, 
natives.
Relationships that produce children are often im plicitly resented by natives because 
o f  the potential problems o f citizenship— in the Baham as, the BVI and 
Saint Maarten.
Age composition
The age structure o f immigrants can have significant impacts on the levels o f living 
o f  the receiving society.
An analysis o f  age is critical to the potential impact on the school population, on 
m anpower supply, and importantly, on the voting population.
The BVI and Saint Maarten exhibit some distortion o f  their age profile.
The median age o f the population in the BVI jum ped from 23.1 to 27.0 years 
between 1980 and 1990, taking it from a “young” population to one that is 
“intermediate” in age.
The number o f persons in the BVI in three age groups— 35 to 39, 40 to 44 and 45 to 
49 years— more than doubled between the same period.
The increase in the number o f immigrant employees in the working ages has pushed 
the dependency ratio downwards, but the BVI will need to reckon with this delayed 
effect on the impact o f all elderly services later on.
Saint M aarten exhibits similar migrant effects on its age distribution: in every 5-year 
age category between 20 and 74 years, the foreign-born exceed nationals by more 
than 50 per cent— as much as 73.0 and 72.8 per cent among those 25 to 29 and 30 to 
34 years respectively.
In each 5-year age group from 20 to 59 years in the BVI in 1991, there was a 
plurality o f migrants— as many as 71.7 per cent between 30 and 34 years old.
Fertility rate
A  fundamental component o f population change is its reproductive capacity.
Young migrants have higher fertility rates than nationals, and this feature imparts 
significant consequences on the growth pattern o f microstates.
In the Bahamas in 1990, non-nationals accounted for 9.4 per cent o f  the population, 
but produced 17.2 per cent o f  the births in that year.
There were 78 births per 1,000 Bahamian women aged 15-44, and 122 per 1,000 
among foreign-born women o f  the same age.
A nother index, the total fertility rate, confirms the higher fertility o f immigrants in 
the Bahamas: 2.46 births for nationals compared to 3.16 for non-nationals.
The higher fertility o f immigrants is o f particular im portance to countries which 
adhere to the principle o f  ius soli— citizenship through birth— because o f the rights, 
such as voting, which redound to the children o f  immigrants.
Higher fertility rates are equally important in microstates which practice ins 
sanguinis— law o fth e  blood— because o f the increasing stock o f locally-born non­
national residents who are excluded from many rights, and who are essentially 
second-class inhabitants w ithout a stake in society.
M arriage patterns
M arriage data from the four countries show that nationals tend to marry among 
themselves.
This also appears to hold among immigrants, when there is an adequate ethnic pool 
from which to choose.
n the BVI in 1991, 12.1 per cent o f the total households were o f  national couples,
10.6 per cent o f  mixed nationality couples, and 25 per cent o f  non-national couples.
In the male-dominated migrant stream to the BVI, 48 per cent o f  immigrants chose 
nationals to form nuclear families.
There is no strong evidence that immigrants marry nationals in large numbers for the 
purpose o f  status regularization.
Size and skills o f  the labour force
Regulated immigrant labour is geared to fill positions for which local labour cannot 
be recruited.
There was little evidence to suggest that immigrants were directly competing with 
nationals in the labour market.
The immigrant labour force in both Saint M aarten and the USVI was larger than that 
o f  nationals.
In Saint Maarten in 1992, the foreign-born labour force constituted 69 per cent.
In the USVI in 1990, the non-native labour force was 69 per cent o f the total.
The labour participation rate, in Saint Maarten in 1992, was 41.2 and 75.6 per cent 
for nationals and the foreign-born, respectively.
In the USVI in 1990, labour participation rates were 29.8 and 66.2 per cent for 
natives and East Caribbean migrants, respectively.
índices o f  relative concentration o f all industries (for the Bahamas and the USVI) 
confirm that nationals are concentrated in public administration and communication; 
in electricity, gas, and water industries; in transport, storage and communication; and 
in financing, insurance and real estate. This is primarily because these jobs are under 
government control and typically require that employees be nationals.
Immigrants cluster in mining and quarrying; in construction and manufacturing; in 
restaurants, hotels, community, social and personal services. These jobs tend to be 
labour intensive, and are largely entry level.
Population density
Changes in population density in small islands is more readily noticeable than in 
métropoles.
There is a tendency for nationals to link social pathologies associated w ith population 
growth to the increasing size o f  immigrant communities.
In no case do statistics bear out the perception that immigrants commit more crimes 
proportionately than nationals.
Population density changes from 506 to 1,544 persons per square mile in Saint 
Thomas, USVI, from 1960 to 1990 support the rising alarm o f natives that their 
islands are “being overrun by foreigners” .
A density o f 2,838 persons per square mile in Saint Maarten— the highest in the 
Caribbean— imparts an even stronger feeling o f crowding that borders on the 
claustrophobic.
Economic
The perception o f many nationals in immigrant societies is that immigrants:
► are a drain on local resources
► depress wages
► increase unemployment during economic recessions, and worst
► they displace natives from jobs.
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• Immigrants become ready targets during periods o f increasing unemployment, and 
are blamed for m any o f the social ills that generate frustration and insecurity:
► escalating crime
► shortage o f  affordable housing
► overcrowding




• An implicit negative impact is that cheap labour reduces the incentive for businesses 
to become more competitive, and thus keeps low-productivity firms in existence.
• It is suggested that the social capital expenditure on housing, education, health and 
social welfare services for immigrants considerably reduces the amount o f  capital 
that is available for overall improvement and development o f the society.
• Empirical studies show that immigrants:
► exert positive growth effects on wages and employment opportunities o f
natives
► tend to accumulate higher levels o f financial capital than natives
► contribute substantially through savings to the capital stock
► have a higher proportion o f  self-employed than natives.
• In general, self-selected im migrant labourers are:
► more economically aggressive
► enterprising and keenly entrepeneurial
► higher-risk takers in business behaviour
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• Natives o f  the Bahamas and Saint Maarten laud their immigrants— particularly 
Haitians— as:
► harder working
► more willing to follow instructions
► possessing a stronger work ethic.
III. Social welfare
U nquestionably, the cost o f the impact o f  immigrants is greatest on the social welfare o f  
migrant-receiving societies in housing, public education and health services.
• Immigrants tend to concentrate in poor housing areas, or sometimes create slums or 
shanty towns that are visually offensive to natives.
• Conditions become so substandard that natives flee the immediate neighourhood; 
more immigrants move in, and an enclave develops.
• U ltimately, it is the local government that must address this environmental problem 
by removing the slums, improving the infrastructure and, at the same time, develop 
a programme o f housing for these denizens.
• Each o f  the four countries o f  this report has been impacted enormously by the cost 
o f  publicly educating immigrant children.
• In none o f  the countries which is required by law to educate the children o f 
immigrants was there any proactively appropriate planning for the total number o f 
school-age children.
• The lack o f planning overburdens all resources— classroom space, teachers, and 
instructional material. The decision makers in Saint M aarten and the BVI are now 
aggressively addressing this problem, despite the huge cost that this entails.
• W hen students do not speak the language o f  instruction, bilingualism adds to the cost 
o f  public education.
• H ealth services are impacted significantly by immigrants, and the cost o f meeting 
these services falls on local governments.
• The cost o f  health care rose dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s in the USVI at 
the height o f its im migrant experience.
• Sim ilar spiralling health costs to meet im migrant needs currently characterize the 
Bahamas and Saint Maarten.
• H igher fertility rates among newcomers, varieties o f  health problems among 
undocumented migrants, and lack o f  health insurance— particularly in 
Saint Maarten— have created conditions where governments must institute 
imaginative solutions, including international assistance, or face the further 
deterioration o f the quality o f  life in their societies.
IV. Political
In the industrial democracies, the extension o f  the “trilogy” o f  rights— civil, political and 
social— to their immigrants in turn affects the treatment which immigrants in the (former) colonies 
expect. It is partly this expectation that generates genuine anxiety on the part o f  natives in the 
microstates o f  this report. Politicians generally respond to nationals’ concern by making declarations 
o f  xenophobia to “keep the aliens out” . The unofficial use o f the term alien in some countries to 
describe immigrants is considered by the latter to be contemptuous, and it serves only to deepen the 
wounds o f division between natives and non-nationals.
However, nowhere in any o f  these microstates, or in any country w ith significant immigrant 
communities, is there any evidence that a political movement was founded on an ethnic group, or 
that such a group attempted to destabilize the government o f  the host country. Notwithstanding, 
there is a deep-seated apprehension that once a significant number o f immigrants achieves the right 
to vote, insidious efforts would be made to “take over the government” .
Despite these misgivings, it should be evident that it is completely inimical to the democratic 
process to categorically deny such a large group o f  residents equal participation in this process, and 
it is also apparent that a political underclass will not serve the best interests o f  a developing society.
V. Cultural
The ethnic diversity that now characterizes the labour movement brings with it some new 
challenges with which migrant-receiving societies must deal. M onolingualism or cultural singularity 
among immigrants is now passé.
The diverse culture o f  immigrants seems to suggest to nationals that w ithout appropriate 
restrictions, the core culture o f  their country will be assaulted, diluted, or transformed to an 
unacceptable degree.
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Politics define the rules that govern citizenship, and the degree o f  cultural homogeneity that 
the host society wants to preserve establishes the type o f  migrant incorporation that it will accept. 
The current perception o f  immigrants, both politically and culturally, largely determines what kind 
o f  incorporation the host society is willing to give to its newcomers.
There is no indication that any one o f these societies desires to foster assimilation— the total 
acceptance and absorption o f immigrants into the host society. Instead, the prevailing type of 
incorporation is one o f  multiculturalism in which the hosts prefer that immigrant communities 
remain distinguishable, and to whom are extended equal rights in m ost spheres o f  life.
Perspectives for action
Given that international migration will almost certainly increase until the end o f the first 
decade o f the twenty-first century, and given the current challenges that beset migrant-receiving 
microstates in the Caribbean, it behooves decision makers in these countries to assume a proactive 
strategic posture in attempting to resolve the intractable issues which now confront them.
Current practices o f  migration control do not seem to offer the full protection o f borders that 
microstates need, for securing the coasts o f all islands in an archipelago, or a shared border with 
another microstate, is well beyond their resource capabilities. Saddled because o f  porous borders, 
with uncontrolled undocumented migrants, to whom basic human rights m ust be extended, 
microstates again appear to need international assistance to overcome this protracted and costly 
problem.
There is a persistent dissatisfaction in these receiving countries with the conditions that are 
associated w ith the presence o f the foreign-born and their progeny in their midst. Despite the 
exhortations o f  the nativists, refoulement does not appear to be a viable option, hence other 
thoughtful strategies need to be applied.
Caribbean microstates are generally unable to apply the leverage o f industrial democracies 
by using trade, investment, financial aid or intervention— military or political— to resolve the 
migration pressures with which they are faced. What policies may these microstates adopt if  they 
are to reduce current migration pressures?
Above everything else, the entry o f  newcomers must be managed to acceptable levels, and 
the immigrant stock m ust be meaningfully incorporated into the societies in which they live.
Other policies may be considered within the context o f  those areas which continue to be 
directly impacted by immigration.
X l l
I. Demographic
a) It is axiomatic that there is nothing more permanent than temporary migrants, and 
this should alert all receiving microstates that their migrants will not simply 
disappear when they want them to.
b) The gains in population control achieved through family planning and other planning 
devices will be lost i f  uncontrolled immigration is allowed to persist.
c) Experience shows that employers are not an efficient group to whom immigration 
control should be entirely entrusted.
d) A  continuing stream o f single-sex migrants will eventually form relationships with 
nationals, and microstates which practise ins sanguinis m ust be prepared to offer an 
appropriate level o f  rights to their progeny.
e) The majority o f  immigrants who are between 20 and 35 years w ill initially lower the 
dependency ratio but will raise the median age; however, relevant planning should 
be instituted to prepare for a larger than normal elderly population with its potential 
increase in retirem ent benefits, etc.
f) H igher levels o f  fertility rates among immigrants suggest that this characteristic must 
be considered as part o f  the planning for all public services for an increasing cohort 
o f  children.
g) Initially, im migrants do not compete with nationals for jobs because they are 
recruited to fill positions for which local labour is not available, but over time they 
w ill become upw ardly mobile and would expect to compete and accede to jobs for 
which they are qualified.
II. Economic
a) The relatively higher accumulation o f savings by immigrants in their early years is 
partly a function o f  their temporary status, but m uch o f  these savings is repatriated 
to spouses, children and family members; status security would release these funds 
for local investment, and family reunion will also cause the reduction o f savings 
being sent back to their homelands.
b) The abuse o f  fair wages by employers to newcomers strongly suggests that there 
should be more vigilant monitoring o f  the conditions under which immigrants work.
c) The practise o f  retreat to xenophobia in periods o f  economic recession and o f 
blam ing immigrants for associated social ills create deep-seated feelings o f
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resentment which do not dissipate for a long time, and moreover, it renders the 
process o f  incorporation a difficult one.
III. Social welfare
a) The provision o f  adequate housing is often a requirement o f  employers in the migrant 
recruitment process, but there appears to be no regulatory agencies to ensure that this 
obligation is met; eventually, local taxpayers through their government must meet 
the cost o f  cleaning up slums, improving the infrastructure, and providing public 
housing for immigrants.
b) Public education proves to be one o f the most costly items for migrant-receiving 
microstates, largely because o f a refusal to accept that all children are entitled to 
public education; such education should be considered to be a part o f  the cost o f the 
immigration process, an investment in the future o f its hum an resource, and thereby 
spare itself the even larger cost o f  dealing with an uneducated, unemployable, and 
unassimilable underclass.
Microstates which are unable to control undocumented migration face a particular 
challenge: even with proper planning they will be unable to predict the numbers o f 
children they will need to educate, and local and national budgets appear unwilling 
to accommodate these costs.
The education o f  unmanageable migration appears to be a clear case for assistance 
from external sources.
c) Almost equally expensive is the provision of health services to immigrants, many of
whom cannot afford health insurance; higher fertility implies more babies, and their
higher median age suggests more health needs. International assistance may also be 
needed to relieve local budgets from their current strain.
IV. Political
Nationals o f democratic microstates simply can no longer regard immigrants in strictly 
economic and demographic terms, for it is antithetical to laud the ideals o f  democracy and yet deny 
citizenship to so many members o f  their societies. The “trilogy” o f  rights o f  immigrants must be 
taken into consideration and evaluated for their impact on receiving societies when plans are being 
made to recruit foreign workers.
V. Cultural
None o f the microstates considered here demonstrates any willingness to promulgate a 
system o f incorporation that would embrace immigrants into the fabric o f their societies. By default,
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multiculturalism  appears to be the prevalent type o f incorporation. By denying assimilation or 
integration to non-nationals, ethnic groups feel excluded from the core o f  society, and this, in turn, 
forces them to band together and appear threatening to the very society that nationals are trying to 
preserve. It is evident that every immigrant society should expand efforts to promote integration o f 
its foreign-born residents.
Finally, a fundamental consideration o f  each microstate should be the establishment o f  an 
agency— w ith appropriate authority to conduct its mandate, and w ith representation by 
immigrants— that specifically deals with the major issues that are associated with immigration. The 
aim is to ensure that each society meets the two primary challenges o f  migration: management o f 
the entry o f newcomers, and the promotion o f  efforts that genuinely integrate long-term residents 
into society.
1. INTRODUCTION
The prominence given by the International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD) in Cairo in 1994 to the persistently high levels o f  labour movements between countries bears 
testimony to the priority that is accorded this theme by member countries o f  the United Nations. 
Labour movements are considered to be important components o f  the worldwide transformations 
that are now taking place, and in this context, these issues offer serious challenges to the planners 
o f population and development policies w ithin the countries that are affected.
International economic imbalances, poverty, political instability and social degradation are 
often associated with conditions that contribute to the persistence o f  labour flows. It has been 
suggested that long-term solutions to international migration issues are fundamentally dependent on 
making the option o f  remaining in one’s country both inviting and viable. However, the necessary 
prior conditions are the promotion o f sustainable economic growth-—with equity and social 
mobility— and development strategies that are congruous with these aims.
M igration flows across the world suggest that the optim um  balance is not likely to be 
achieved within the foreseeable future. The state o f underdevelopment that exists in many Third 
W orld countries almost ensures that their households will continue to seek out new avenues in their 
quest for a better life for their families. At the same time, this type o f  movement has the effect on 
some migrant-sending countries o f contributing to further under develop those countries. It appears 
that this vicious cycle cannot be broken by the efforts o f  the underdeveloped countries by 
themselves. One m ay well wonder whether the direct involvement o f  governments in the promotion 
o f emigration o f  their citizens is a genuine expression o f their commitment to assist their 
countrymen, or an implicit admission o f  their inability to provide the quality life that is sought by 
these emigrants.
The industrialized countries o f N orth America, Europe and Asia are under intense external 
pressures to relax restrictionist policies that serve to keep out immigrants from countries in transition 
and from developing countries. They not only face internal demands from temporary immigrants 
for family reunification and other social adjustments, but they must also respond to the strident 
exhortations o f  nativists for the refoulement o f  non-natives and the erection o f further restrictionist 
policies against further immigration.
These tensions between receiving and sending countries were quite evident at the ICPD 
meeting, and their agreement to continue to seek ways to ameliorate these conditions speak to their 
mutual need for an improvement in the current situation.
In m any respects, the Caribbean region exhibits the symptoms that characterize migration 
in other parts o f  the world. For much o f  its relatively short history, however, it has been typified by 
the large num ber o f  its residents who have migrated largely to North A merica and Europe. At the 
same time, there have been distinct periods when intraregional migrations have dominated the 
movement o f  its peoples.
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Extraregional migration has been the dominant type o f labour m ovem ent in the Caribbean 
during the latter h a lf o f  the twentieth century. Simultaneously, a minor but significant intraregional 
movement has developed, and it persists to the present. It is with this latter m igratory flow that this 
report is concerned, for it is one that threatens to overwhelm small-island countries.
Specifically, this document attempts to present in detail the consequences that immigration 
has had, and continúes to have, on selected Caribbean small-island coúntries. These countries are 
distinguished by econom ies which are based primarily on tourism, by per capita incom e levels which 
are among the highest in the region, by the need for various proportions o f  foreign labour to sustain 
the growth o f  their economies, and by native populations which are all desirous o f  controlling the 
extent to which their homelands seem to be threatened by outsiders. The countries selected for study 
are: the Baham as, the British Virgin Islands (BVI), St. Maarten (in the Netherlands Antilles) and the 
Virgin Islands o f  the United States (USVI)).
Section 2 presents a b rief introduction to the conditions throughout the period which help 
to explain some o f  the forces which gave rise, firstly, to the global labour movements, and secondly, 
to the intra-Caribbean migratory flows. This is followed by a presentation o f  the characteristics o f 
im migration in the selected Caribbean microstates. The section also includes a discussion o f the 
prim ary factors that prom ote migration. Section 4 details the range o f  impacts on the selected 
countries: dem ographic, economic, social, political and cultural. The final section offers
recom m endations that m ight be im plem ented at national and international levels.
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2. THE LABOUR MOVEMENTS OF THE LATTER HALF OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
2.1 North America and Europe
The depressed economic conditions w hich prevailed throughout the Caribbean during the 
early part o f  the twentieth century extended throughout the period between the First and Second 
W orld Wars. The collapse o f  the stock market in 1929 in the United States and the subsequent deep 
recession only served to worsen life for Caribbean residents. None o f  the colonies in the region 
belonging to the m etropolitan countries had yet become independent, and the involvement o f the 
mother countries in two W orld Wars left them even less able to provide a moderate standard o f 
living for the majority o f  their wards. In these early years, there were notable movements o f Eastern 
Caribbean migrants to the cane fields o f  southeastern Cuba and to the Dominican Republic. 
Jamaicans and others from the (British) W indward Islands also journeyed to the east coast o f Central 
America to work the cane fields and banana plantations o f United States multinational corporations.
After the Second W orld War, the labour needs o f North America and Europe became acute. 
A series o f  bilateral agreements between the United States and Mexico— the Bracero Programme 
o f  1949— provided M exican agricultural workers for farms in the southwest. Almost 250,000 
Mexicans trekked north to work, but 3 out o f  4 o f  these workers were undocumented. Between 1951 
and 1990, the United States admitted a total o f  17.6 million legal immigrants (Calavita, 1994, 56), 
while her neighbour to the north, Canada, accepted 5.7 million over the same period (Garcia y 
Griego, 1994, 124). It is estimated that 485,300 immigrants from the New Commonwealth were 
admitted to Great Britain between 1953 and 1962, and 709,700 were accepted for settlement from 
the New Commonwealth and Pakistan from 1979 to 1991 (Layton-Henry, 1994,275-277). Between 
1950 and 1990, some 5.6 m illion emigrants had left the Caribbean Basin (Guengant, 127, 1996).
The decades o f  the 1950s and 1960s were among the most consequential in the immigration 
history o f the Atlantic countries. The events in the métropoles had significant impact on both the 
movements o f  labour out o f  the Caribbean and within the Caribbean Basin.
The Bracero programme and its attendant hordes o f  undocumented Mexicans in the United 
States generated feelings o f  anti-immigrant nativism and public demands for restriction. These, 
together w ith racism, apprehension o f tax increases, cultural and political protectionism, fears o f 
depressed wages and displaced United States workers, and the concerns o f organized labour over its 
bargaining power, ultimately led to the response in 1954 o f Operation Wetback. Hundreds of 
thousands o f  Mexicans were rounded up and deported (Calavita, 1994, 61).
Sweeping changes were made in the United States to the im m igration system by the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) o f  1952. Each country was allotted an annual quota o f 
immigrants, thus perpetuating the national origins system. It also established a first preference 
system for the immediate family o f  citizens and legal residents, and made provision for skilled and 
unskilled workers. In 1965, the ENA was substantially modified to allow no more than 20,000
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immigrants from any one country. Priority was again given to applicants with close relatives in the 
United States, or to persons w ith specific needed skills. Only minor adjustments were made to this 
scheme during the 1970s and 1980s.
W orld W ar II created an acute labour shortage in Great Britain, and these conditions 
continued for more than a decade. The resumption o f emigration o f  Britons to Australia, the United 
States, Canada and to parts o f  A frica only served to exacerbate labour needs in the country. Despite 
the vitriolic campaigns o f  racist politicians like Enoch Powell and Cyril Osborne for immigration 
control o f  non-whites, thousands o f W est Indians from the colonies emigrated to England. During 
this time, British subjects— who included British citizens and citizens o f  colonies and independent 
Comm onwealth countries— could not be excluded from the Fatherland. The same insecurities and 
frustrations that were caused by poverty, unemployment, casual work, overcrowding and crime, and 
for which Jewish im migrants w ere blam ed in 1940, are similar to those for which non-whites were 
held culpable in the 1950s. The control legislation that was embodied in the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Bill subjected Com m onwealth immigrants to an entry voucher unless they were bom  
in the United Kingdom or carried a passport issued by the British government. Further restrictionist 
policies were imposed in 1965 by the abandonment o f the preferences given to non-white war- 
service veterans and the annual quota ceiling o f  8,500 New Commonwealth immigrants. By 1968, 
the Commonwealth Im m igrants Act virtually eliminated W est Indian m igration to Great Britain 
(Layton-Henry, 1995).
Up until 1952, Canada did not have a formal immigration policy in place, though its practice 
was distinctly exclusionary o f  non-whites. Its first comprehensive im migration act in that year 
formally denied entry to “social undesirables” . The policy was further articulated by its Prime 
Minister, M acKenzie King, who led the nationalist view that no foreigner had a fundamental right 
to enter Canada. During the 1950s, however, a number o f West Indians migrated to Canada on an 
intergovernmental scheme for the provision o f domestic workers. It was not until 1962 that Canada 
abandoned its racist exclusionary policy by amending its regulations o f  1952. It provided for 
universal admission based on skills, family unification and humanitarian conditions (Garcia y 
Griego, 1995).
Guengant (1996, 128) has shown that the net migration balance for 24 selected Caribbean 
countries between 1950 and 1990 was negative for all but 2 o f them. In fact, during that period, the 
only countries that recorded net positive migration were the independent countries o f  the Bahamas 
and French Guyana, and the dependencies o f the United States Virgin Islands, Sint Maarten, the 
British Virgin Islands, the Caym an Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands.
A comparison o f  m igratory movements in the Caribbean region and beyond suggests four 
distinct trends which are likely to shape the nature o f labour migration into the twenty-first century. 
First, the globalization o f  m igration— the increase in the number o f  countries which are
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simultaneously im pacted on by migration— is marked by a more and more diverse socioeconomic, 
cultural and ethnic stream. Second, the intensification o f the volum e o f  the migrant flow is likely 
to magnify the complex o f appropriate government policies that attempt to ameliorate the impact o f 
immigration.
Third, the differentiation o f m igration adds to the difficulties o f  the policy measures to 
control m igration because o f  the tendency o f  the movements to change from one type to another. 
Fourth, there is the tendency to feminization o f  migration, in which the expanding movement o f 
w om en is less that o f  family reunification than o f deliberate moves on their part in search o f labour 
opportunities (Castles and Miller, 1993).
The discussion above indicates that between 1950 and 1975, the m ajor streams o f emigration 
from the Caribbean Basin to the North American and European métropoles were gradually reduced. 
As these routes became more restricted, intra-Caribbean migration became more pronounced.
2.2 The rise of intra-Caribbean migration
In absolute terms, the number o f Caribbean persons who emigrated to other parts o f  the 
region w ithin the last 40 years is miniscule compared to the number o f  emigrants to the métropoles. 
A numerical estimate o f  intra-Caribbean m igration over the last 40 years was placed at 500,000, and 
thus represents about 10 per cent o f Caribbean emigration (Guengant, 1996, 129). It is also 
suggested that this comparatively marginal num ber reflects a reduction in the integration o f 
Caribbean labour markets compared to the first few decades o f the century. W hile all countries of 
the region can be described to some degree as migrant-sending microstates2, the primary senders to 
other Caribbean destinations are the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jam aica and Guyana. Within the 
same period, Caribbean countries which have recorded the largest net migration gains are the 
Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, St. M aarten, the Turks and Caicos Islands 
and the United States V irgin Islands.
W hat is substantively different between this intra-Caribbean m igration and that directed to 
the métropoles is the striking proportional impact that labour movements have on insular 
microstates. These impacts will be elaborated in Section 4 below.
2Microstates is defined as “small states with limited land area, limited populations and limited resources, which are politically independent or 
internally self-governing, with the determination to be recognized as separate and distinct entities and the urge to move as far and as fast as 
possible into the category of developed countries” (Harrigan, 1972).
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What, then, were the conditions which stimulated, reinforced and extended the existing 
migratory labour movements o f the post-World War II era to new intra-Caribbean destinations? 
Some of these conditions are now listed:
i. By the mid-1950s, the European colonial powers were ready to shed themselves of 
their colonies. These colonies exhibited the classic characteristics o f  Third World 
countries with vast labour surpluses.
ii. The collapse o f Cuba as a tourist haven for North Americans stimulated the 
emergence o f alternative tourist destinations.
iii. The advent o f jet travel made Caribbean destinations more accessible to Americans, 
Canadians and Europeans.
iv. Uncontrolled international borders became easier to cross; unguarded shorelines 
offered numerous entry points.
v. In the domestic markets, agricultural decline had set in, and many countries became 
reservoirs o f  surplus labour.
vi. The race and class systems o f the period o f colonial slavery remained entrenched, 
and these reinforced the sharp economic and social inequalities between the haves 
and have-nots.
vii. Internal political conditions in some States created pressures that fostered outward 
movement.
viii. Significant disparities in population growth and densities between contiguous States 
or nearby islands stimulated emigration.
ix. A few microstates possess the combination o f resources— white sand, azure bays, 
vacation hotels, cheap service labour and appropriate infrastructure— that made them 
particularly attractive as tourist destinations.
X. The development o f improved transportation systems at levels that were affordable
to most persons provided options for potential migrants to seek out a better life 
overseas.
xi. Family networks, complemented by modem communications, significantly assisted
migrants in joining relatives who were already abroad.
7
3. C H A R A C TE R IS T IC S  O F IM M IG R A TIO N  IN  FO U R  S E L E C T E D  C A R IB B EA N
C O U N TR IE S
3.1 Generalizations o f immigration in  the selected countries
The four countries selected for study in this report have at least one thing in common: with 
membership in the Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), they have 
experienced or are currently undergoing significant impact from intra-Caribbean immigration. The 
countries are: The Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, St. Maarten and the United States Virgin 
Islands.
The Commonwealth o f the Bahamas, a former colony of Great Britain, is now a free and 
democratic sovereign nation. It is made up o f about 700 islands, 40 o f which are occupied. The 
British Virgin Islands, a British dependent territory, consists of about 40 islands, with 99 per cent 
of its population on 4 main islands. St. Maarten— the smallest of the microstates with an area of 13 
square miles— has the unique distinction of sharing one island with French St. Martin. As a family 
member o f the Netherlands Antilles, it is administered primarily from Curacao, both of which are 
under the sovereignty o f the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Three main islands of the 100 islands, 
Cays and rocks that make up the United States Virgin Islands are occupied. It constitutes an 
unincorporated territory o f the United States.
There are certain features which characterize these countries. Moreover, a number of 
collective generalizations can be made which derive from their common experiences with 
immigration in the recent past.
i. In hemispheric terms, these four countries are miniscule, and are often classified as 
microstates.
ii. The engine o f growth of their economies is tourism.
iii. In its initial phase, the growth of the tourist industry requires supplies of labour that 
are not met domestically, and solutions are found by encouraging relatively large 
numbers o f immigrants-—who provide cheap labour— from countries with labour 
surpluses.
iv. The private sector organizes the importation o f foreign labour, sometimes bypassing
official institutions created to manage immigration flows, but government is
occasionally compelled, for political correctness, to intervene in order to regain
control.
8
v. Many groups— such as business owners and middle-class consumers—benefit 
immediately from the proceeds generated by immigration, but the costs— especially 
of the long-term impacts o f unskilled and undocumented migrants on society— are 
deferred.
vi. The dependence o f these economies on tourism exposes them to the vicissitudes of 
the economic performance o f the market areas from which they draw their tourists, 
and this invariably leads to periods of growth and decline with attendant exacerbation 
of domestic problems during economic recession.
vii. They all have significant proportions o f their populations which are foreign-born 
(when compared to the United States with 9 per cent in 1994): 17 per cent in the 
Bahamas (1990), 50 per cent in the British Virgin Islands, 53 per cent in St. Maarten 
(1992) and 33 per cent in the United States Virgin Islands (1990).
viii. With the exception o f the Bahamas, which is a sovereign State, none of the other 
dependencies has full control over its immigration policies.
ix. The dependent countries are simultaneously experiencing emigration and 
immigration, the latter stream being the more dominant.
X . In various ways, all have experienced or are experiencing severe economic and
social— including political— problems due to uncontrolled immigration.
xi. Having experienced heady population and economic growth, economic competition 
and resentment o f foreigners tend to magnify the inequalities within society and 
sometimes promote xenophobia and policies of nativism.
xii. Much o f the contemporary difficulty o f immigration control is explained by the 
confluence o f labour markets in these receiving countries and the requirement to 
observe the human rights o f immigrants.
xiii. Because of the difficulties o f protecting their borders, undocumented migrants seem 
to be aware that “Once you get one foot in the door, you can get in” .
xiv. The tourism-based economies are unable or unwilling to reduce the domestic 
conditions that attract migrants, and they are mere spectators o f the basic market and 
demographic forces o f the sending countries.
XV. There is no clear understanding at what point in the future will current restrictionist
policies collide with private-sector business interests in maintaining the quality life 
styles that are made possible by the cheap services of immigrants and their 
production o f low-cost goods.
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xvi. In countries where they exist, it appears that second-generation immigrants are much 
more strident in the assertion o f their political rights than are first-generation or one- 
and-a-half generation immigrants— children who migrated with their parents and 
grew up in the host country.
xvii. The costs o f subscribing to international conventions that protect the human rights 
o f undocumented workers impose considerable financial burdens on each of these 
microstates.
xviii. None of these counties has succeeded in the full integration of its diverse 
immigrants— the existing forms o f integration appear to be variants of assimilation, 
exclusion and multiculturalism.
3.2 Factors promoting migration
Social scientists have perhaps contributed more than the practitioners o f any other discipline 
to the large body of literature on the causes o f international migration (Lee, 1900; Todaro, 1900; 
Lucas, 1983; Stark, 1993; Martin and Midgley, 1994). Both Mills (1988) and Guengant (1993), 
among others, have also attempted to explain Caribbean emigration. The variegated reasons for 
migration may be reduced to push and pull forces that are both economic and non-economic. This 
explanation is somewhat oxymoronic: the causes appear simplistic but their elaboration is complex. 
These simple reasons of push-pull provide necessary but not sufficient conditions to account for 
migration at its current levels.
The pu ll or demand factors which promote migration include: the rapid economic growth 
in the 1950s and 1960s o f Caribbean migrant-receiving countries, and the guest worker, “temporary” 
or other bond-type programmes which were consequently instituted, and which initiated 
unprecedented labour flows (as in the United States Virgin Islands); the direct recruitment of labour 
in migrant-sending countries by governments or employers (as in the British Virgin Islands); and 
family reunification. On the push or supply side was the rapid abandonment of agriculture as West 
Indian colonies became independent, and with increasing unemployment and underemployment 
throughout the region; the concomitant low wages in stagnant economies; the build-up of surplus 
labour in the British Caribbean as the United Kingdom shut its doors to its former colonists in 1962; 
and the simple personal need to live abroad, an act which is so indispensable for social acceptability 
in the Caribbean.
Three more explanatory causes for Caribbean migration are provided, particularly in the 
context o f this report.
First, Stark (1993, 102) additionally proposes the theory of relative deprivation to explain 
migration. It is a concept based on social inequalities. The feelings o f deprivation which arise from 
these inequalities— racial, social, economic— increase as the number o f persons in the referent 
society who have it becomes large. He believes, further, that migration may be characterized as:
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a function o f the inequality in the distribution o f income by size in the sending and receiving 
countries; directly related to inequality in the sending society; and negatively associated with 
inequality in the receiving country (Stark, 1993, 115). In brief, the relative deprivation theory of 
international migration suggests, ceteris paribus, that the decision to migrate to a foreign labour 
market is reached as a result of feelings o f deprivation in the group of reference.
Second, the concept o f networking or linkage provides the spark that connects potential 
migrants to their destinations, and provides the means necessary to move. These links were 
generally established from prior contact during the colonial period, and might have been influenced 
by politics, trade, or cultural events. These links are rooted with family members and friends already 
settled overseas. They are the sources of economic opportunities abroad, particularly on modes of 
entry, and they are also the major sources o f information on life in the host country. These 
transnational networks are established even during guest worker or temporary migrant programmes, 
so that when restrictions are lessened or removed, movement is rapid and directional.
Third, some political scientists have argued that it is necessary to look beyond the macro and 
microeconomic explanations (of the push-pull and relative deprivation hypotheses), beyond social 
networks to trends in political development in migrant-receiving societies. The debates in the 
industrialized democratic countries over immigration levels, naturalization and asylum policies are 
closely related to what is referred to as rights-based politics. These rights-based issues are also now 
forcing Caribbean receiving countries to try to determine what level o f annual migration to accept, 
from which countries to permit immigrants, and what rights and services should be accorded these 
immigrants. This new brand of rights-based politics is not only instrumental in helping many 
immigrants to enter, but to stay in these labour-importing countries (Cornelius et al., 1992, 8-9).
It is this latter explanation of international migration—rights-based liberalism—that gives 
rise to the iron law o f  labour immigration. This law is o f particular relevance to the migrant- 
receiving microstates of the Caribbean, for it asserts that the concept of temporary migration is just 
that— a concept. The reality is that in labour immigration “there is nothing more permanent than 
temporary workers” (Martin, 1994, 86). The implication is clear for receiving countries, and it 
behooves Caribbean migration policy makers concerned with immigration control to take heed: no 
country can expect to completely isolate itself from migrants, for as long as immigrants pass through 
any one o f the three doors— the fron t door o f legal immigration, the side door o f grey-area 
immigration, or the back door o f illegal immigration—temporary migration will definitely result in 
some level o f permanent migration.
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4.1 Classification of impacts
Policies that are designed to promote or facilitate immigration are hardly ever conceptualized 
in terms of the full range of consequences that are attendant on labour movements. There appears 
to be no hypothetical formulation at this stage o f the direct relationship between the percentage of 
non-nationals within a society and the community’s tolerance level. Data below suggest two 
working principles. First, countries with large populations tend to react much more slowly to the 
rising number of foreigners in their midst than small countries— especially small islands. Second, 
racial, ethnic, sociocultural and linguistic sameness of foreigners with nationals tend to minimize 
and reduce adverse reactions when the proportion of immigrants rises.
However, there is no question that sustained immigration has enormous consequences for 
any country, irrespective o f size. Domestic reaction to the impact is merely a function of how soon 
the threshold of toleration is reached, and this is generally much sooner in smaller countries.
The primary areas o f impact may be categorized as demographic, economic, social, political 
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Wherever administrative decisions are made to admit immigrants to the domestic labour 
market, it is always on the basis that the domestic labour force is not large enough to meet all the 
needs o f planned economic growth in particular industries or in particular occupations. 
Simultaneously, because the policy in place allows the demand to determine the supply, and because 
immigration is often regarded by the migrant-receiving country as temporary, the concomitant 
growth in population always appears to exceed expectations, and in all cases it has overwhelmed 
some aspects o f planned services and infrastructure. The growth curves illustrated in Figure 1 
demonstrate two salient features.
The first is that the decennial population increases in the smaller islands were remarkable by 
standard measures o f growth. While the Bahamas, with the largest population, shows fairly even 
growth during its last three decennial censuses, the population of the United States Virgin Islands 
increased by 95 per cent between 1960 and 1970, and by 55 per cent between 1970 and 1980 (see 
tab leD l). The British Virgin Islands experienced 47 per cent population growth from 1980 to 1991 
(table Bl),  and St. Maarten experienced the most extreme population changes over three decades: 
increases o f 186 per cent between 1960 and 1972, 68 per cent between 1972 and 1981, and again 
more than doubled— 145 per cent—between 1981 and 1992 (table Cl). It is noteworthy that these 
increases in population took place at the same time that emigration o f nationals from each of the 
four countries was taking place.
The second noticeable feature of Figure 1 is that the rapid growth was not due to natural 
causes o f net births over deaths, nor to significant increases in fertility rates. Net immigration 
largely accounts for the dramatic growth within the relatively short periods of time. The figure also 
shows the percentage o f the stock that was o f foreign origin. It is noteworthy that the industrial 
countries react strongly to migration issues when the percentage of immigrants in their midst 
approaches 10 per cent, but these microstates have had to sustain immigrant growth that was 
severalfold larger than that of metropolitan countries.
While the growth of the immigrant stock in the Bahamas appears modest compared to that 
o f the other countries shown in Figure 1, the percentage o f immigrants still exceeds that considered 
by advanced industrial countries to be tolerable. It reached a high of 16 per cent in 1970, declined 
to 6 per cent 10 years later, but increased again to 10 per cent by 1990. Bahamian officials attribute 
this latter increase to the uncontrolled influx of Haitians by boats, and though major efforts are made 
to stem this flow, they are only partially successful. It is likely that the per cent o f non-nationals will 
increase until the exodus from Haiti is significantly reduced.
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The figure o f the United States Virgin Islands presents a typical curve of population growth 
due principally to immigration that is necessary to meet labour demands: rapid early increases of 
both the overall population and of immigrants— from 16 to 34 to 38 per cent migrants in 1960,1970 
and 1980 respectively— and signs of decrease when the demand is largely met. The decline follows 
the introduction of strong federal immigration legislation and enforced protection of its borders. 
The flow has been dramatically reduced for all but overstaying visitors and sporadic undocumented 
boat immigrants from the Dominican Republic, Haiti and China3. The decrease from 38 to 35 per 
cent non-nationals between 1980 and 1990 reflects both a reduction in the flow o f new immigrants 
and also a wave of emigration by regularized United States Virgin Islands foreign-born residents to 
the United States mainland.
Patterns o f population growth in the early stages of the immigration cycle are demonstrated 
by the curves for the British Virgin Islands and St. Maarten. The figure shows that the latter is the 
only country in the last 30 years with a majority of its residents of foreign origin— 54 per cent in 
1992. The implications for this small Antillean island are far-reaching for its long-term 
development. The British V irgin Islands, the smallest of the territories— in population—also posted 
significant immigrant growth with non-nationals constituting 12, 35 and 50 per cent of the 
population in 1970,1980 and 1991, respectively. Like St. Maarten, the prospects o f naturalization 
of these foreigners and their offspring can have acute consequences for the political evolution of 
these countries.
Such levels of growth in any country could not be allowed to continue without direct 
intervention by the State. Any economic expansion to which immigrants contributed substantially, 
or in which they came to share, could not survive for any meaningful length of time under this type 
of unplanned increase. It is explained below how this growth affects age and sex structures as well 
as a number o f other demographic characteristics.
A common feeling expressed by nationals in these countries is that as non-national 
proportions o f the population become larger, the islands become more visibly crowded, they appear 
to become “smaller”, resources seem to be gobbled up by the provision o f services to immigrants, 
and they must therefore preserve their homeland from further incursions of the patrimony.
4.2.2 Sex composition
O f the three principal factors that determine the sex structure o f a population— fertility, 
mortality and migration—the movement of people has the most dramatic, short-term impact on the 
distribution of people.
-'More than 300 undocumented Chinese arrived in the United States Virgin Islands since 1994. They claim to be political refugees and on their 
way to the United States mainland—they do not stay in the United States Virgin Islands. They typically agree to pay gangs in Fujian province in 
China some $20,000 to $40,000 with a small down payment to fly or sail them halfway around the world. The Chinese generally enter the United 
States Virgin Islands by showing up looking totally stranded and lost—speaking no English—on the shores of small bays on St. John, having been 
deposited there from the nearby British Virgin Islands or St. Maarten (The Daily News, Jan. 11,1996).
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It was pointed out above that the feminization of the migrant stream is considered to be one 
o f the four distinct trends that shape the current labour movement. Particularly in the Caribbean and 
Latin America, it appears that this region is the only one in the developing world where women 
predominate in the migrant stream. The sex difference in the proportion o f migrants seems to be 
largely determined by the employment opportunities that are available for women in the migrant- 
receiving country. These opportunities exist in the tourist industry as service workers in hotels, gift 
shops, restaurants and related occupations. It seems that the old model o f women traveling after 
their male companions have settled for family reunification is no longer the norm.
Two of the most common numerical measures of sex composition o f a population are: the 
sex (or masculinity) ratio, and the ratio of the excess or deficit of males to the total population. 
These two indices may be usefully employed to measure inter-area or inter-group comparisons, or 
for comparisons over time (Shyrock, Siegal, et al., 1980, 191).
The sex ratio, usually defined as the number o f males per 100 females4, indicates an excess 
o f males when the sex ratio is above 100, and an excess o f females when the ratio is below 100. 
Most national sex ratios generally fall in the narrow range o f 95 to 102, except when there are severe 
impacts like war or heavy immigration. Sex ratios that fall outside the range of 95 to 102 are 
considered extreme.
The second index o f sex composition—the excess or deficit o f males as a per cent of the total 
population5— has a point o f balance or a standard o f zero. A positive value indicates an excess of 
males, and a negative value indicates an excess o f females.
All o f the censuses of the Bahamas indicate that there has been an excess o f females in the 
population: the last three censuses show sex ratios of 98.3, 94.5 and 96.1 in 1970, 1980 and 1990 
respectively (see table A1 in Appendix A). This is also the case among Bahamian nationals with a 
ratio o f 94.9. However, the pattern among immigrations is the reverse. In 1990, men outnumbered 
women among immigrants as is demonstrated by the sex ratio of 107.6. Table A1 also presents the 
per cent deficit o f males in the population, but table A2 shows that the excess o f  males among non­
nationals is 3.6 per cent o f that group. It will be shown below— in the following section—that the 
concentration o f males in certain age groups far exceeds the overall ratio o f the immigrant group. 
The effect of this reversal of the sex ratio on the country is not evident because of the relatively small 
size— 9.4 per cent— of the non-national population.
The historical pattern of the sex ratio in the British Virgin Islands is illustrative of the effect 
of migration on the structure o f a population. The censuses o f 1946 and 1960 show that the British 
Virgin Islands had feminine sex ratios of 93.6 and 98.5, respectively. The earlier years were marked
4The sex ratio is given as: (P„IP/) x 100, where P„ is the number o f males and Pf  is the number o f females.
'The excess or deficit o f males is given by: [(P„-Pj) /  P,] x 100, where Pm and P ( are as given in the footnote immediately above, and P c is the 
total population.
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by constant emigration of males due to the relatively poor performance o f the economy. However, 
in more recent years, the predominantly male flow o f immigrant labour has resulted in sex ratios 
among non-nationals o f 113.0,104.6 and 105.2 in 1970,1980 and 1991, respectively (tables B1 and 
B2 in Appendix B).
An imbalance in the sex ratio also prevails in the population o f St. Maarten. In 1991 it was 
97.4. Unlike the British Virgin Islands, females among immigrants outnumber males; the ratio was 
94.8. This index is bordering on the extreme, and is indicative of the youthful women who migrate 
to St. Maarten (table C3).
Table 1 illustrates the changes in the overall sex ratios o f a country that may be caused by 
the shifting composition of its population with respect to nativity—i.e., native and non-native. The 
United States Virgin Islands was selected to demonstrate this effect; however, the method of 
analysis can be extended to any other country for which there are appropriate data.
The general rise in the overall sex ratio o f the United States Virgin Islands from 1917 to 1990 
can be analyzed with respect to the contribution that changes in each group— national and foreign- 
bom—made both to the nativity composition of the population and to its changing sex ratio.
Table 1(a) shows the sex ratios of each census year for the United States Virgin Islands. The 
principal features are: that the country exhibits a low sex ratio for all its years from 1917 until 1990; 
that the excess o f females declined gradually by 14.1 points between 1917 and 1970, increased over 
the following decade by 7.8 points, and declined again by 2.1 points between 1980 and 1990; and 
that ratios below 90.0 are indicative of extreme situations and must be accounted for by immigration 
alone.
Table 1(b) also reveals that a low sex ratio prevailed among nationals, although no year is 
considered extreme, with the exception of 1930. This can be explained by emigration from the 
United States Virgin Islands to the United States mainland, as was most likely the case from 1917. 
Throughout the latter half of this century, young native males have favored the United States military 
for a variety of reasons6. Among the foreign-born residents, the excess of females declined from 
1930 to 1960 when the inflow was almost equal for men and women. What is also noticeable is that 
all censuses but that o f 1960 reveal excessive feminization of the immigrant labour force, as is 
evidenced by the extreme sex ratios, all of which are below 90.0, except for 1960. These wide 
deviations from 100.0 also provide evidentiary information on the sex-selective character of 
migration to this small country.
In the absence of migration, the sex ratio o f a population is expected to fall close to 100. The 
significant deviations in the United States Virgin Islands and other immigrant countries is a clear 
indication o f the compositional changes that result from heavy immigration or emigration. The
6Requests to the armed forces for data on the number of native Virgin Islanders who leave home to join the military have been denied on the grounds 
that the data are “classified”.
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importance of this characteristic is not limited to the excess o f one sex in the population, but extends 
to the social implications and the impact which this imbalance may have on local government 
migration policy.
4.2.3 Age composition
Data on the age o f a population is the most important variable in the study of fertility, 
nuptiality and mortality. While all countries in the Caribbean have responded to the United Nations’ 
call in 1960 to treat the inclusion o f age in censuses, there has been far less recognition o f the need 
to collect data on the age structure o f immigrants. These data are essential in proactive planning for 
the rational development o f their societies.
One o f the simplest but most useful methods of assessing the consequences o f immigration 
on the age composition o f a population is to examine the magnitude of the numbers relative to each 
other, and of the amount and per cent o f change in each age category. The British Virgin Islands is 
enduring a relatively rapid inflow o f labour, and this country is selected for an investigation of this 
kind o f impact.
Data for the British Virgin Islands are presented in table 2. Given that the foreign-born 
population increased by 74 per cent between 1970 and 1980, and by 107.7 per cent between 1980 
and 1991, and there is an excess o f males in the migrant stream, one can expect that this inflow 
would markedly affect the age and sex structure. In 1980, almost 4 out o f 10 residents were between 
the ages of 15 and 34. In fact, the median age of 23.1 indicates that 50 per cent o f the population 
was concentrated below that age, and 50 per cent above it. This median is just slightly above what 
is considered a “young” population. Eleven years later, with an influx o f young adult immigrants, 
about two-thirds— i.e., 68.4 per cent— o f whom were between 15 and 44 years, the population 
reflects this “aging” process. In 1991, the median was 27.0 years, indicating an aging society. The 
British Virgin Islands is thus described as a country of “intermediate age”.
The table demonstrates that the change for all ages combined is 46.7 per cent. However, this 
number does not provide any indication of the intercensal changes by age, nor can these be derived 
from the overall change. The last column o f table 2 shows that while the total population o f the 
British Virgin Islands increased by approximately 47 per cent, this increase is exceeded by two age 
categories, those between 25 to 29 and 30 to 34 years. Even more importantly, the population in the 
three age groups between 35 and 49 more than doubled in the intercensal period. (For similar data 
on the United States Virgin Islands, see table D2.) This dramatic growth o f middle-age British 
Virgin Islanders may be attributed to the combined effect of two factors. The first is that as the 
economy has strengthened and levels of living have improved, more nationals are staying at home 
and fewer are emigrating. Second, the surging economy is also attracting young and middle-aged 
immigrants to work in the construction and hotel industries and in the retail trades.
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This is a clear indication of possible drastic repercussions that will visit any set of social 
programmes geared to the elderly: health services, pension and retirement plans, and general age 
dependency.
Another indicator o f the effect of a relatively large immigrant labour force is the movement 
of the age dependency ratio (ADR). This measure reflects the proportion of the combined child 
population and the elderly to the working-age population. It is essentially an index that measures 
the social and economic impact of different age structures. This ratio is a useful indicator of the 
burden— or lack of—that some age structures impose on a population. The higher the ratio is, the 
more people each worker has to support. The impact on households with large families is obvious.
The ADRs for the British Virgin Islands were 115.5,79.8,66.6 and 48.8 in 1960,1970,1980 
and 1991 respectively. The index for 1960 means that there were about 1.2 dependants per working- 
age person, which can be considered a heavy load since each working-age person did not actually 
work. By 1970 and after, the ratio dropped and remained below 1.0— the 1980 ratio was about half 
that o f 1960. The ADR for the British Virgin Islands has been on a steady decline since. The 
relatively low current ratios for the British Virgin Islands and St. Maarten— see table 3— are a direct 
function o f the movement of young adult immigrants into the productive working age.
It has been suggested that the ADR is regarded with an aura o f economic significance that 
is unjustified. Instead, an economic dependency ratio (EDR) is recommended. A ratio of the 
economically inactive population to the economically active population is considered to be a much 
more meaningful measure o f economic dependency, for it embodies not only a country’s age-sex 
structure, but also its economic activity participation rates. Table 3 shows EDRs for the four 
countries in this study. It indicates that in 1990 the United States Virgin Islands had the highest 
EDR, and that in 1992 St. Maarten had the lowest (tables C2 and C3). The higher EDRs indicate 
higher dependency on the active work force. For small families, a high EDR implies higher taxes 
to support schools, health facilities and subsidized housing. For those in business, whether 
government or private, a high EDR suggests that workers will spend more on their families and save 
less, and government revenues must be diverted to food, housing and other welfare programmes 
rather than on financing industry or commerce or economic infrastructure such as roads, electricity, 
water and sewer distribution, and communications systems.
It is essential that planners— in the British Virgin Islands and St. Maarten 
particularly— understand the implications of their current low ADR and EDR. The influx of 
immigrants is primarily in the productive working-age groups, and they add very little to the 
dependent age groups. However, as the immigrants have children, as they age, and if  they stay in 
the country, they will over time contribute their share to the dependency groups. It is prudent for 
population planners o f the British Virgin Islands and St. Maarten to be proactive about this delayed 
impact o f the elderly on the future of their societies.
In order to appreciate further the repercussions of heavy immigration on the age distribution 
of a migrant-receiving country, its percentage age distribution may be compared to that of a base
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country. This may be accomplished by deriving indices for each age group, or an overall index for 
an age distribution, and the procedure is illustrated for the British Virgin Islands and Saint Maarten. 
The United States is used as a base.
Remarkably, both the British Virgin Islands and Saint Maarten had substantially higher 
proportions o f their populations up to age 44 years older than comparable groups in the United 
States, with the exception o f the 5-to-14 and 15-to-24 age groups for Saint Maarten. The data in 
table 4 show that the indices o f several age groups of Saint Maarten are more extreme than similar 
cohorts in the British Virgin Islands.
Two additional indices— of relative difference and of dissimilarity7— help to emphasize how 
very different are the two age distributions of the two receiving countries when compared with that 
o f the United States as a receiving country with only 8 per cent of its population being foreign-born. 
The index o f relative difference and the index of dissimilarity, which capture the magnitude of the 
differences between any two age distributions, also confirm that the distribution of Saint Maarten 
is more heavily impacted on than that of the British Virgin Islands, even though the latter 
distribution is itself significantly different from that o f the United States which serves as a base.
Immigrants in general tend to be young adults when they first arrive, and to have higher 
fertility rates than nationals. The immediate effect is to reduce the proportion o f the elderly and to 
create a “younging” effect on the population.
4.2.4 Fertility rate
The fertility o f a country refers to the reproductive capacity o f its population, or to the 
number o f live births occurring within it. In the context o f this study, it is a fundamental component 
of population change. In the absence o f significant migration, a high or low fertility rate largely 
determines the population growth o f a country. It was pointed out above that young immigrants tend 
to have higher fertility rates than nationals of migrant-receiving countries, and the combined impact 
of moderate to high immigration levels with above-average fertility rates can impart enormous 
consequences on the growth pattern o f a microstate. The case o f the Bahamas is used to illustrate 
the essence o f the fertility effect.
Table 5 presents observed rates. From the data, it can be derived that immigrants accounted 
for 9.4 per cent o f the population in 1990, but produced 17.2 per cent o f the live births in that year 
(table 6). The crude birth rate, which indicates the number o f live births per 1,000 population in a 
given year, is significantly higher for immigrants than for national Bahamians in the last three 
censuses. It is this perception of the rapid growth in the number of non-nationals which generates 
fear among nationals of being overrun in their homeland by foreigners.
7
The index of relative difference and the index of similarity are two summary measures o f the differences between two age distributions. The former 
is based on the sum of the deviations of the age-specific indices (without regard to signs); the latter on sum of the absolute differences between 
the per cents at each age.
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Two other indices which speak to the fertility of the population, and allow comparison o f the 
subgroups, are the general fertility rate and the total fertility rate. The general fertility rate, a 
somewhat more refined measure than the crude birth rate, defines the number o f births per 1,000 
women o f childbearing age. The data in table 5 show that there were 78 births per 1,000 women 
ages 15-44 among Bahamian nationals, and 122 births per 1,000 women in the same age group of 
non-national women.
The total fertility rate is one of the most valuable indices of fertility, because it provides the 
best possible estimate of the number of children that women are currently having. That is, it is a 
single-figure measure that sums up the rate o f all women at a given point in time. The index 
indicates the average number of children that would be bom alive to a woman during her lifetime— if 
she were to pass through all her childbearing years conforming to the age-specific fertility rates of 
a given year (Shyrock et al., 1980, 484).
The fourth column of table 7—the age-specific birth rate— denotes the likelihood of a woman 
giving birth during each year o f her childbearing years. In each five-year age group (in table 7(b) 
and table 7(c)), except the 15-to-19-year category, the likelihood o f a non-national woman giving 
birth is always higher than that of a Bahamian national. By age 35, family size among nationals 
average 2.1 children, while the same family size is reached among non-nationals at age 30.
Total fertility rate for all women age 15 to 44 years was 2.2 births: that o f nationals was 2.5 
births, and of non-nationals it was 3.2 births. The table shows that the average age at birth of 
mothers was 27.4 years for nationals and 27.9 for immigrants. (For additional data on fertility, see 
tables B3, B4, C4, C5, D3 and D4).
Figure 2 presents a comparative view o f fertility patterns in the four countries for both 
nationals and non-nationals. The graph for the United States Virgin Islands demonstrates that all 
through the reproductive period, immigrants were more active than nationals. Between age 15 and 
30, immigrant young females in Saint Maarten also reproduced at a higher rate than nationals.
This appears to be consistent with the prevailing view in the migration literature that foreign- 
born women tend to have larger families than nationals. Part of the explanation in the United States 
Virgin Islands is that many women from the neighbouring islands— the British Virgin Islands and 
Antigua and Barbuda particularly— go to the United States Virgin Islands to have their babies so that 
they can claim the right of ius soli for their children.8 In Saint Maarten in 1981, the fertility rate of 
foreign-born teenagers was twice as high as native young women. By 1992, while the rates of both 
groups were reduced, that of immigrant young women still remained 50 per cent higher than 
nationals’ (tables C4 and C5).
The Bahamas is the only country in the group in which national teenagers have higher 
reproductive rates than immigrants, an occurrence which contradicts the norm stated above. This
S u p p o rtin g  data for this view were provided by the Bureau o f  Health Statistics, United States Virgin Islands.
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phenomenon deserves further study in the light of national efforts to reduce fertility rates. The 
British Virgin Islands also presents a deviation from the norm. In general, younger nationals tend 
to be more productive than immigrants, but after age 30 when family sizes average 1.7 children, 
immigrants then appear to be more productive.
The implications o f this general pattern of higher reproductive rates among immigrants also 
contributes to some of the fears that are expressed by natives about the long-term effects o f non­
nationals increasing in such proportions as to take over their societies.
4.2.5 Patterns in union status
Residents o f a country tend to marry or form unions with other residents o f the same racial, 
ethnic and socioeconomic background. In industrial receiving countries, marriages between 
nationals and immigrants are often discouraged or looked upon with some degree o f disapproval. 
In England, current concern is expressed about the trade in marriages o f convenience as a means of 
obtaining permanent residence (Layton-Henry, 1992). Belgian law prohibits an immigrant entering 
the country through marriage with a legal resident from bringing in a new spouse if  the marriage 
ends in divorce. And Japanese in Tokyo express ambivalence toward having their daughters marry 
foreigners (Cornelius et al, 1994). In the United States, fraudulent marriages between citizens and 
foreigners have engendered extraordinary efforts by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to 
minimize this occurrence.
Perhaps the most common measure of nuptiality is the crude marriage rate. The variation 
that is observed from country to country may be a function of one or more o f the following: the 
proportion o f the population that is o f marriageable age; the proportion o f marriageable age who 
have previously married; the level o f economic development o f the country; provisions for 
dissolving marriages; and customs that relate to remarriages (Shyrock et al., 1980, 555). Even 
though the crude marriage rate provides useful information as a gross measure o f the relative 
frequency o f marriages/unions and permits comparisons among countries, it appears more useful to 
examine the patterns o f intermarriages/unions between nationals and non-nationals.
In the British Virgin Islands in 1991,12.1 per cent o f the unions were among nationals, while
10.6 per cent of all unions were between nationals and non-nationals. Twenty-five per cent of the 
unions were between non-nationals, and 31.7 per cent o f non-nationals lived alone (tables B5 and 
B6). In 1980 in the United States Virgin Islands, 41 per cent o f the native-born grooms married 
native women, while 39 per cent foreign-born grooms took United States brides (Virgin Islands 
Department o f Health [VIDH], 1980). In 1989, the comparable marriages were 95 per cent among 
natives, and 53 per cent immigrant grooms marrying brides who were citizens. And in 1990, 
marriages were respectively 94 per cent and 53 per cent (See table D5) (VIDH, 1989 and 1990).
In some countries, marriages between citizens (or permanent residents in the United States) 
and immigrants are often used as a device to offer the immigrant a rapid path to naturalization. 
There is an increasing number of such occurrences in Saint Maarten among male Saint Maarteners
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and Domincan Republican women. In the British Virgin Islands where for many years immigrant 
family unification was not facilitated, it was inevitable that there would be unions between nationals 
and non-nationals. This presents a real challenge to the continuation of such a policy in the light o f 
the place within society o f the children of such unions, together with those bom of non-nationals. 
It does not appear that any society can ignore the increasing size of these children and adults who 
know no other home but who are denied the full range of rights and privileges as young nationals.
4.2.6 Size and occupational skills o f the labour force
The precise impacts o f immigrant labour on the economies o f receiving countries have not 
been thoroughly studied. What has been observed in repeated cases, however, is that relatively little 
attention is paid to the long-term impact o f workers as long as there is a demand for labour that 
would clearly contribute to the growth o f that economy. The process is encouraged as long as that 
immigrant labour does not compete with natives for their preferred types of jobs, nor does it 
negatively influence wages, working conditions, welfare and unemployment. During recessions, 
immigrants are among the first to be targeted, and their presence in the labour market gradually 
becomes a social, economic and political issue.
The Netherlands Antilles—primarily Saint Maarten— and the United States Virgin Islands 
present examples o f that effect. Table 8 shows that of the economically active population— or the 
labour force— in the Netherlands Antilles, there was a significantly higher (crude) participation rate 
in 1992 among immigrants than among nationals— 61.7 per cent to 43.3 per cent respectively. This 
was also the case in Saint Maarten where the respective rates were 75.6 and 41.2. What is also 
demonstrated is that there is a higher unemployment rate among nationals— 16 per cent—than 
among immigrants in the Netherlands Antilles as a whole, but the reverse is true in Saint Maarten 
where the corresponding rates were 9.7 per cent and 16.5 per cent, respectively.
In the United States Virgin Islands, the labour force participation rate9 among foreign-born 
workers was high. For Eastern Caribbean immigrants it was 72.3 per cent, and o f other foreign-bom 
residents it was 68.8 per cent. The rate was 60.5 per cent for natives, 77.2 for United States in­
migrants, and 52.1 for those of Puerto Ricans ancestry (table 9).
Unlike the case o f Saint Maarten, the unemployment rate of Caribbean-born immigrants is 
lower than that o f native United States Virgin Islanders. The higher unemployment rate of 
Saint Maarten is perhaps a reflection of the proportionately larger number of undocumented workers 
there than in the United States Virgin Islands. These immigrants are ineligible for local government 
or federal jobs, and there are not many other employment options available when the economy is 
sluggish. This was particularly the case immediately after hurricane Luis in September 1995, which 
caused the closure o f several businesses, mainly hotels, which employ many immigrants.
9The labor force participation rate in the United States is defined as the per cent o f the total number o f people working to the sum  o f the n u m b e r  
o f people working plus those over age 16 not looking for jobs or retired (Shim and Siegel, 1995).
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Reference was made above to the perceived competition which immigrants present to 
nationals. In all o f the countries studied, a plurality o f migrant labourers is intended for occupations 
that cannot— or will not—be met by domestic labour. Consequently, one expects that managerial, 
local and federal government jobs are reserved for nationals.
While this tends to be so during the early years o f immigration, immigrants penetrate these 
occupational positions over time. This insinuation is considered to be a threat to the established 
order in every country, and the reaction to this generally appears to be one o f alarm and anger. The 
accession of native-born second generation immigrants who can legally and professionally claim 
certain occupations sometimes appear to accentuate the perceived threat o f immigrants taking over.
Economic data from the Bahamas given in table 10 may be used to illustrate the dispersion 
of nationals and non-nationals in the occupational structure o f that country. Nationals in 1990 
predominated as service workers (23.0 per cent), clerks (16.8 per cent), in the crafts (15.4 per cent), 
and in elementary occupations (15.2 per cent).
Proportionately, there were about twice as many non-nationals (30.4 per cent) in elementary 
occupations as nationals, and there were more than twice as many non-nationals in the professions 
(14.4 per cent) as Bahamians (6.7 per cent).
Native Bahamians showed greater proportions than non-nationals in the technical professions 
(9 to 6 per cent), among clerks (17 to 7 per cent) and among service and market sales workers (23 
to 8 per cent). Importantly, there were also proportionately more non-nationals in the class of 
‘legislators, senior officials and managers’ (7.1 per cent) than nationals (5.1 per cent). This was 
probably not the case for legislators and senior officials, but perhaps so in the managerial category, 
reflecting the proportionately larger number of foreign businesses and their representatives. (See 
tables A3 to A5 for additional data on occupation and industry in the Bahamas.)
The distribution is different in some respects in the United States Virgin Islands (see table 
D6). Significantly more citizens (27.1 per cent) occupied ‘managerial and professional specialty’ 
positions in 1990 than foreign-born residents (15 per cent). However, like the Bahamas, more 
immigrants occupied service positions— 23.5 per cent, primarily food preparation, personal, cleaning 
and building service— than citizens (16.0 per cent). A larger proportion o f immigrants— 69 per 
cent— worked in the private sector compared to 56.4 per cent nationals, but more o f the latter—33.8 
per cent—worked in the federal and local government than non-nationals— 20.6 per cent. The 
similarities in occupation and in the distribution o f employees in industries among immigrants in 
both the Bahamas and United States Virgin Islands are perhaps a reflection o f the dominant tourism 
sector in their economies. (See also tables B7-B9, C6, C7, and D7). The similarities in occupation 
and in the distribution o f employees in industries among immigrants in both the Bahamas and the 
United States Virgin Islands are perhaps a reflection o f the dominant tourism sector in their 
economies.
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In general, documented immigrants are allowed into receiving countries to fill jobs in specific 
industries where the demand cannot be met by natives who are already employed, or who elect to 
forego certain kinds of work.
Over time, however, immigrants may opt to leave the jobs for which they were allowed into 
the country—either because other more remunerative types o f employment become available, or 
more secure and steady work may be obtained. Policy makers often need to know to which 
industries locals or immigrants are attracted.
One method of determining this attraction is by the use of indices o f concentration. The 
index basically indicates where the concentration of a characteristic, or lack o f it, occurs; i.e., it 
reveals where there is more or less of the characteristic compared to what would be expected, based 
on its proportion in the population at large.
Table 11 shows indices of concentration10 of all industries for the four countries of this 
report. Certain patterns which emerge tend to support the indicators provided above by a 
comparison of percentages.
First, nationals tend to be over-represented in electricity, gas and water industries; in 
transport, storage and communication; in financing, insurance and real estate; and in public 
administration and education. This concentration of nationals is partially because these industries 
are under local or federal government or quasi-government control, and because many positions 
require skills that do not predominate among immigrant labourers. Moreover, the temporary status 
of most immigrants ensure that they cannot hold certain positions for which only citizens or 
permanent residents qualify.
Second, immigrants are concentrated in mining and quarrying (with the exception o f the 
United States Virgin Islands); in construction; in manufacturing; in restaurants, hotels, community, 
social and personal services. These positions tend to be labour intensive, are largely entry level, 
often start at the minimum wage with less-than-standard working conditions, and it is easier for 
employers to avoid the provision of insurance or of paying social security for their workers.
This concentration pattern changes with time as immigrants achieve or develop skills, and 
are able to sell their labour for higher wages and better working conditions. More importantly, with 
a change in immigration status to ‘belonger’ or ‘naturalized’, they then become eligible to apply for 
certain positions that were heretofore restricted to nationals.
10One method for deriving an index o f  concentration is given by Richmond (1983,303): [A /  E * 100], in which “ ’A ’ is the proportion o f  a certain 
group in a given category and ‘E’ is the expected proportion”, this latter being defined as “that found in the population as a whole” . The value o f 
this index is that it conveys more information than mere percentages, given that it allows proportionate comparisons to be made, and it accounts 
for the large variations that sometimes exist between native and immigrant populations.
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At a certain historical point in each of the countries being discussed, there arose a perception 
that the size of the population was growing beyond the carrying capacity o f that country. It is the 
apprehension of this threat to the capacity o f their society to sustain continued population growth 
at current levels o f living and patterns o f life that generates so much passion in the discussion of 
uncontrolled immigration. A common charge, especially in small islands with limited land mass, 
is that population density imparts negative social impacts, including psychopathology, crime and 
violent or aggressive behavior (Day and Day, 1987).
Despite the position that geographers have taken on this subject, that this theory of crowding 
cannot adequately explain the social conditions associated with density, government officials and 
many natives adhere to a recognition of the existence of limiting conditions in the continuing trend 
o f population growth due primarily to the increasing number of immigrants. Their case appears 
plausible when they refer to rising crime rates, increasing scarcity and costliness o f decent housing, 
and the deteriorating quality of the environment. However, these social and physical pathologies 
may not be due to the immigrants themselves— in fact, statistical tests confirm that the crime rate 
among non-nationals is not significantly higher than among natives". A more plausible explanation 
may lie in the overall growth in population and increasing pressure from external influences.
The question has been posed as to why these pathological conditions do not serve as a 
stimulus to action to halt this population increase, primarily if  it is associated with legal immigration 
(Day and Day, 1987, 343). Part of the response seems to lie in the inherent challenge to officials 
to avoid doing anything that will inhibit the economic growth that is fueled by cheap, migrant 
labour, and to discover that precise balance at which their society would grow just right.
Increasing population densities are very real to the natives who can remember former times 
in which they lived with ‘adequate’ personal space. St. Thomas in the United States Virgin Islands, 
an island of only 32 square miles, increased its population density from 506 persons per square mile 
in 1960 to 1,544 in 1990. Saint Maarten, an even smaller geographic unit o f 13.1 square miles, 
jumped from a density o f 525 persons per square mile in 1970 to 2,838 persons per square mile (or 
1,096 per square kilometer) in 1994. Although both the Bahamas and the British Virgin Islands are 
archipelagoes with several uninhabited islands, their primary islands of New Providence and T ortola 
respectively have themselves undergone dramatic physical changes because o f rapid population 
increases.
Despite the expressed fears o f nationals concerning this index o f population increase, Day 
and Day (1987, 351) suggest that the man/land ratio is more o f an expression of area than it is of 
human reaction to density, or of the relationship of population to resources. It is suggested further 
that the ratio is not very meaningful as an indicator o f comparison between countries with entirely
4.2.7 Population density
11 Available data for the British Virgin Islands, show n in table B15, support this statement.
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different socioeconomic and environmental conditions. In the final analysis, population density 
should be examined in static and dynamic terms, largely because it cannot be separated from either 
the social or cultural dimensions of the society, its demographic attributes, or the set o f social 
changes taking place.
4.3 Economic
While there is a considerable literature in migration on the economic effects of emigrants on 
their sending societies, there is no comparable volume of the impact on receiving societies. Much 
of the research on the effects of immigrants on the domestic economy seems designed to establish 
that immigrants are a drain on local resources, that they depress wages, that they increase 
unemployment, and they displace natives from jobs.
A number of studies have shown that immigrants exert positive growth effects on the wages 
and employment opportunities o f natives, that immigrants tend to accumulate higher levels of 
financial capital than natives, that the savings of immigrants contribute substantially to the capital 
stock, and that proportionately more immigrants are self-employed than natives. It is also suggested 
that employers consider immigrants to be harder working, more willing to follow instructions and 
possessive o f a stronger work ethic. Empirical evidence from the United States shows: 1) that 
immigrants create more jobs than natives in their areas of location; 2) that the wages of the typical 
native grew more in areas of high immigration than in other areas; and 3) that immigration improves 
the wages o f Anglo women (Enchautegui, 1994, 30).
In the countries under study, the economic consequences— expansion and decline— are more 
striking than are usually observed in the traditional industrial societies. Large supplies o f labour 
were critical to the expansion of the tourist economies o f the Bahamas and the United States Virgin 
Islands, and a similar situation characterizes the current economic expansion o f the British Virgin 
Islands and Saint Maarten. In all of these microstates, immigrants provide replacements for 
domestic workers in jobs that natives are no longer willing to perform, and release them for higher- 
paying jobs. However, it has been argued by some economists that the availability of cheap labour 
in migrant societies reduces the incentive for businesses to become more competitive, and thus keeps 
low-productivity firms in existence. Additionally, it is suggested that the social capital expenditure 
on housing, education, health and social welfare services for immigrants considerably reduces the 
amount o f capital that is available for overall improvement and development.
In this section, the economic effects of immigration are discussed under three headings: 
income and savings, labour wage rates, and the influence on politics.
4.3.1 Income and savings
In many ways, immigrants are not random selections o f the communities from which they 
come. Most o f these migrate for economic reasons, and can be considered to be self-selected for 
success. They tend to be younger (see section 4.2.3 above), are likely to be more economically
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aggressive, enterprising, keenly entrepreneurial, higher risk-taking in behavior, and possess a higher 
stock o f human capital.
One economist has observed that “first generation migrants who have been in their new 
country for a while often have a higher mean income ... than the indigenous (native-born) 
population” Stark (1991, 371). He recognizes that the characteristic of higher mean income among 
immigrants is confounding, particularly because immigrants in most countries are economically 
discriminated against by natives. The former generally face institutional, informational, language, 
social and other impediments, yet they are often able to outperform many native-born residents. 
Personal interviews in three o f the four countries discussed here indicate that immigrants are 
regularly paid less, in general, than equally-skilled natives. The proposed explanation for higher 
average income o f immigrants is that if  immigrants plan to return to a low-wage country of origin, 
they exert a higher level o f work effort than that put out by native-born workers. “Other things being 
equal, migrants who have a higher probability of return migration will have steeper earning profiles 
than migrants who have a lower probability o f return migration” (Stark, 1991, 392).
Data from the British Virgin Islands do indicate a lower poverty rate among immigrants than 
natives. In 1991, 24.1 per cent o f the households that were classified as ‘national’ were considered 
poor, compared to 11.7 per cent o f those classified as ‘foreign’. Similarly, 21.4 per cent of the 
‘national’ householders were poor while 15.3 per cent of the ‘foreign’ householders were poor also 
(table B 14). In Saint Maarten, the modal monthly income of nationals and non-nationals alike was 
NAfl,001 to 2,000. However, while 44.1 per cent o f the immigrants fell below the modal category, 
only 15.6 per cent of the nationals did so (table C8). In the United States Virgin Islands, natives 
show higher median incomes— $12,102— than immigrants from the Eastern Caribbean— $11,423 
(table D8).
In an attempt to account for the higher savings rate of immigrants relative to that o f native- 
born citizens, two empirical facts from United States census data are considered. First, the 
likelihood that a person who is foreign-born will be self-employed is significantly higher than that 
o f a similarly skilled native. Second, self-employed workers have higher incomes than salaried 
workers— which holds for both natives and non-natives. Self-employment entails a higher risk than 
being an employee, but provides a higher average return— and variance—than wage employment.
Stark (1991, 385) puts forward a mathematical proposition: the higher the probability of 
return migration the higher is the level o f savings. Two corollaries derived from the proof o f this 
proposition state: 1) as a consequence o f the possibility of return migration, migrants save more than 
the native bom; 2) if  return migration does not take place, migrants’ wealth outweighs the wealth 
of the native bom.
Stark (1991, 385) infers that “given the possibility o f return migration, migrants save more 
than the native bom. Thus, if  return migration does not materialize, migrants outperform the native 
bom and migrants from countries to which the probability of return is larger will have higher mean 
incomes. The analysis also indicates that migrants’ contribution to capital formation ... is higher
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than that o f comparable native bom ”. He concludes that if  the contribution o f capital accumulation 
is considered a valuable attribute o f immigrants, it is incumbent on the host country “to devise 
measures that prevent the return probability falling to zero” (Stark, 1991, 386). The logic seems to 
be that if  immigrants plan, or are under the threat, to return home, they will likely accumulate wealth 
for their eventual repatriation. This is evidently one o f the most challenging aspects o f migration 
policy for receiving countries.
Economist Stark does not provide empirical data for any country to support his theory and 
mathematical formulations. However, from the United States Virgin Islands, testimony submitted 
before a congressional subcommittee by the Alien Interest Movement stated that “aliens and their 
spouses and dependants have built up substantial ‘equities’ while residing and working in the United 
States Virgin Islands... ‘The 1971 round-up of illegal aliens’ (which resulted in the deportation of
9,000 aliens in a few months) had a staggering impact on the economy and particularly retail 
business establishments...” (Committee on the Judiciary [COJ], 1975, 50). It is reported that local 
bankers and other businessmen intervened to request a halt to the deportation because it was causing 
a run on the banks by depositors for their savings, and also had strong adverse effects on the 
economic viability o f other businesses.
Economic microdata to support the income levels of migrants and their savings patterns are 
difficult to obtain, but this is evidently an area for further research because o f the strong policy 
implications.
4.3.2 Wage rates
In every country covered in this study, there is a pervasive perception that immigrants 
adversely affect the employment opportunities ofnationals, even though no supporting evidence was 
forthcoming to buttress this belief. However, “studies consistently reveal that immigration has no 
significant effect on the wages or employability o f natives” (Enchautegui, 1994, 30). The positive 
economic effects o f migrants on wages (in the United States) is largely through complementarity. 
In other words, if  immigrants complement natives, a rise in wages is likely from an increase in 
immigration. Empirical work demonstrate that African-American men, Latino natives and Anglos 
experienced improved wage rates in areas o f high immigration. But these improvements in wages 
do not hold under all conditions.
The impact of immigration on the wages o f natives is largely influenced by the elasticities 
of labour demand and the elasticities of labour supply. In conditions where wages can be readily 
manipulated by employers and where immigrant labourers may readily be substituted for natives, 
high immigration will depress wages. Documented information from the United States Virgin 
Islands helps to explicate this situation.
"Without alien manpower, the Islands could not have experienced such a high rate of 
economic growth. It was employers, though, who profited the most...” (Miller and Boyer, 1980,10). 
Such profit seemed to have come at the expense of both immigrants and natives. At the pinnacle of
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the period o f growth, general wages were low. The wage rate that was set by employers for bonded 
workers became the prevailing rates for the primary occupations for which immigrants were allowed 
to enter the country. Thus because o f the high elasticity o f the labour supply, employers eschewed 
the need to offer inducements of higher wages and better working conditions to indigenous workers. 
Immigrant female domestics12 appeared to have been severely discriminated against by an hourly 
wage rate as low as SO.54 per hour or S23.76 per 44-hour week, compared to $77 for similar work 
and time in New York (Social, Educational Research and Development, Inc. [SERD], 1969, 46). 
However, when the Department o f Labour proposed that the minimum wage o f immigrants be raised 
to SI.60 per hour, the business community mounted so strong an opposition that the proposal was 
deferred and then died quietly.
Despite the evidence that employers largely controlled the importation o f cheap foreign 
labour, that “most native Virgin Islanders have regarded manual labour— agricultural or 
commercial— as degrading [and] above all, they want a Government job” (Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law [SICIL], 1975,15), a local organization presented 
to a congressional subcommittee that “aliens depress wage rates and working conditions for native 
Virgin Islanders” (SICIL, 1975, 48). The complicity o f the government with employers to keep 
wage rates artificially low worked to the detriment of natives, who in turn agitated in various forms 
against immigrants within their community.
4.3.3 Unemployment and politics
Popular concerns o f nationals become most vocalized during periods o f high and increasing 
unemployment. Immigrants usually become easy targets for domestic workers. The former tend to 
be blamed for ills that generate frustration and insecurity: crime, a shortage o f housing,
overcrowding, unemployment, failure to meet their tax burden, poverty and environmental 
deterioration. These reactions, which appear exaggerated in small insular societies, are also evident 
in the industrial receiving societies.
The economic processes underway in the United States since the 1970s have increased the 
demand for migrants to fill minimum-wage, unskilled and part-time positions. But as Americans 
have faced dwindling opportunities during these times, their anxiety has been extended in hostile 
ways to the newcomers. The political response expresses itself through national restrictionist 
policies like the Immigration Reform and Control Act o f 1986, the Immigration Act o f 1990, and 
at the State level, through the ominous manifestation o f ethnic cleansing embodied in California’s 
Proposition 187 (Ojeda, 1996).
In France, foreign workers were heavily concentrated in the heavy industries of steel, 
automobiles, mining and shipbuilding. A shift to highly technical, information-based industries 
rendered these industries almost obsolete, and industrial restructuring pushed unemployment among 
foreigners from 4.6 per cent in 1975 to about 14 per cent in 1982 and almost 20 per cent by 1990.
l:The term dom estic  or domestic worker is com m only used in the United States Virgin Islands to describe household service workers.
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Political activity among unemployed and disaffected immigrants stimulated the rise ofthe national 
anti-immigrant political party o f the Front National. This in turn led to further political and cultural 
militance among immigrants (Hollified, 1994). In Germany, economists warned that their country’s 
famed industrial engine was being calcified because the prevalence o f cheap foreign labour 
prevented a proactive approach to the development of new technologies. German xenophobia and 
the oil embargo of 1973 prompted the government, in response to immigrant-driven strikes, to ban 
further recruitment o f guest workers and to restrict further immigration (Martin, 1994).
In the island o f Saint Maarten, the laid-back approach to the entry o f migrants changed as 
the presence o f foreigners became more highly visible and as Antillean nationals publicly reacted 
to decreasing job opportunities and “being pushed out and shut out of the labour market” (Larmonie, 
1995, 7). The worsening economic situation led to a government policy o f “search and remove”, 
but employers’ concern for the viability o f the tourist industry secured a moderation of this measure.
By 1970 in the United States Virgin Islands, the economic boom with virtually full 
employment had come to a major juncture. An economic downturn was engendered by a crisis in 
the tourist industry brought about by the closing of a number o f hotels. A slowdown in construction 
due to tightened credit availability generated a level of unemployment— above that on the mainland 
United States— that was unprecedented since the inception o f the foreign labour programme in the 
mid-1950s. These economic conditions precipitated more official action (designed to deal with the 
protracted immigrant problem) within a two-year period than in the previous 15 years.
The United States Congress passed Public Law 91-225 in 1970 which essentially promoted 
family reunification by allowing spouses and minor children to join “temporary” workers in the 
United States. The unforeseen effects in the United States Virgin Islands increased the proportion 
of foreigners markedly. The relatively poor performance of the economy at that time led natives, 
in the absence o f any evidence of job competition, to demand decisive action to expel undocumented 
workers. A federal Department o f Labor survey “found that over 40 per cent o f the United States 
citizens and permanent residents registered for employment... were classified in occupations for 
which there were no competing alien job seekers”, and subsequently, that “the composition of the 
Islands’ unemployed did not support the assumption that ‘aliens were being certified in jobs Virgin 
Islanders wanted’” (SICIL, 1975,42). However, police and immigration officials began a roundup 
at midnight of 28 February 1971 and “everyone found without proper documentation was taken to 
jail and then told to get off the island as quickly as possible... Deep and widespread bitterness was 
left in the roundup’s wake among those aliens who remained” (SICIL, 1975, 44). Despite much 
progress, this bitterness reared its head once more in the local politics o f 1996.
The fundamental issue in this section is that wherever it appears that immigration helps to 
promote economic growth, subsequent downturns in the economy almost always are associated with 
foreign-born residents. And almost invariably, politicians and nationals alike call on government 
to resolve the issue, irrespective of the degree of benefit that devolves to the country because of the 
contribution o f the foreign-born.
4.4 Social welfare
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A third major impact of immigrants on receiving countries— after that on demography and 
on the economy— is on the social infrastructure of the society. This impact may usually be seen in 
the effects on housing, education, health services and on some aspects o f the physical infrastructure. 
Where governments are directly involved—beyond the policy level— in the immigration of labour, 
institutional policies usually exist in varying degrees o f adequacy to minister to the housing, 
education and health needs o f immigrants. Experience in the Caribbean and elsewhere has shown 
that when the immigrant process is not marked by a clear social policy, or when it is left in the hands 
of employers, or where uncontrolled immigration gives rise to a relatively large number of 
undocumented migrants, the dislocation in social welfare services often gives rise to strong feelings 
o f animosity by nationals against foreign-born residents.
Relations between the groups are further weakened when escalating costs to maintain the 
social infrastructure are met by increases in the tax burden of nationals. The classic case in 
California o f Proposition 187 to exclude undocumented and certain other migrants from basic 
services like education and some forms o f welfare is matched by the French seuil de 
tolérance— threshold o f tolerance— in both housing and educating immigrants13. The record in the 
Caribbean suggests that where proactive policies have been adopted in response to the needs of 
immigrants, the results have generally been positive for those societies. It appears that in countries 
which respond reactively to immigrant-related social problems which have become entrenched, the 
issues are not readily resolved and they tend to be far costlier—both in terms o f social relations and 
immigrant incorporation.
The three sections that immediately follow examine the effects o f  immigrants on housing, 
education and health services.
4.4.1 Access and quality o f housing
Each o f  the countries under study demonstrates some degree o f residential segregation of 
immigrants. Identifiable causes for this segregation include the following characteristics which also 
exist elsewhere. 1) Most immigrants arrive without much capital and begin in low-income jobs. 2) 
Some landlords refuse to rent to them by price discrimination or other subterfuges, or charge high 
rents for poor or squalid accommodations. 3) Immigrants tend to seek cheap housing in working- 
class neighbourhoods. 4) Proximity to bus lines or other economical means of daily transport are 
often in substandard residential areas. 5) Immigrants themselves may create their own areas of 
housing concentration for economic— ethnic businesses, agencies, etc.— and social reasons such as 
their desire to stay close together for mutual support, to maintain family and neighbourhood 
networks, and most importantly, to retain the language and culture o f their native land. This 
principle o f ethnic herding for protection sometimes leads to ghettoization.
l3The seuil de tolérance  o f  France lim its the presence o f  immigrants to a maximum o f  10 to 15 per cent in housing estates, and to 25 per cent o f
students in a class.
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The process o f residential segregation possesses elements of contradiction. The clustering 
o f immigrants is sometimes perceived by the majority population as a deliberate effort to create 
ethnic enclaves. These enclaves may even be regarded as threatening to the political order. On the 
other hand, immigrants may be forced into this situation by a dearth o f affordable housing or by 
discrimination. And residential concentration appears to be a necessary precondition for community 
formation of immigrants.
The maquila economy14 of Nogales serves to illustrate the kind o f housing quality that 
attends sudden population growth o f a small immigrant community.
Twenty new residential districts appeared in Nogales ... between 1986 and 1989, the 
maj ority o f which are substandard dwellings built by the migrants themselves on land 
they “invaded” . .. Three factors were found to empirically differentiate workers with 
regard to their housing. The most strongly differentiating factor combined the 
availability o f  electricity and durability of walls (i.e., cardboard vs. wood or sheet 
metal), the second factor differentiated workers’ housing by whether it had running 
water and sewage, and the third on the amount of “free” space.15 (Kopinak, 1996, 
221-222).
The maquila housing for immigrants described above is not atypical. Two Saint Maarteners 
describe similar conditions in their island.
The living conditions o f many immigrants are below human conditions. They live 
in one-room or two-room shacks, made of plywood and pieces o f carton; wooden 
floors covered with old pieces of carpet. Many have no water, electricity or toilet 
facilities. The one- or two-room house functions as a bedroom, kitchen, living room, 
bathroom, etc., and their children are growing up under these unusual conditions.
Some of these shacks cost over $100 a month (Wyatt, 1995, 3)16.
The Saint Maarten Government has not developed a housing development plan, 
neither for immigrants nor for citizens. The great bulk of the immigrants live in 
shacks: plywood and zinc-plate structures, without or with minimal electricity and 
no running water and no in-house toilet.
It is true that a few years ago the Government started to take action against these 
shacks and shanty-towns. The effect o f their presence— ecological problems, sewage 
problems, etc.— had become all too bad to continue to ignore. In the course o f this
,4A maquiladora  is a new  factory or factories established by foreign investment money along the northern border o f  M exico with the United States. 
(See Kopinak, 1996.)
lsKopinak states that there was not only no free space in the housing occupied by immigrants, but that overcrowding is the norm (1996, 222).
l6Aruba, an autonom ous political entity o f  the Kingdom of the Netherlands, experienced steady immigration since 1986 in support o f  the growing 
tourist industry with a concom itant housing crisis. It was estimated that by 1995 the government needed to construct 8,185 housing units— or 42.6 
per cent above the 1991 stock— in order to meet the current demand (UNDP, 1994).
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action many shacks were tom  down as being too far below standard, and a great 
number was upgraded. However, it does seem that the plan has lost a great deal of 
its steam (Larmonie, 1995, 6).
In the United States Virgin Islands, the two largest companies— an oil and alumina 
refinery— made provision in housing for some o f its workers. However, the vast majority of other 
immigrants serving the tourist and related industries were “on bond” or undocumented, and could 
not be housed in the 4,800 public housing units which were constructed. “Housing is a serious 
crisis” (SERD, 1969, 8) and “action will be required on the part o f the government to consider 
special kinds o f housing to fit the special needs o f aliens”. SERD (1968) also recommended that the 
Government o f the United States Virgin Islands should take a major responsibility in providing 
decent housing for all its residents (tables D9 to D12).
Four generalizations may be made in respect o f housing. First, most employers do not seem 
to meet their responsibility o f housing immigrants when they are required to do so. Second, 
unplanned immigration appears to create an inevitable crisis in the housing industry, and immigrants 
often resolve their housing problem by constructing units which do not meet housing standards. 
Third, the large number o f migrants without housing tenure might suggest that financial institutions 
would make mortgage loans available to those who could afford them. This does not appeal to 
money lenders because o f the real risk of their investment in non-citizens who may flee or be 
coerced to depart. Fourth, citizen complaints about decaying neighbourhoods, visual blight, 
unsanitary living conditions and declining property values pass responsibility ultimately on to the 
government to identify the huge capital outlays that are required to increase the supply of the 
affordable housing stock. And the cost is even higher when additional infrastructure o f roads, water 
and sewer systems and electricity supply are included.
The housing conditions o f nationals and non-nationals in the British Virgin Islands are 
illustrated in tables BIO to B13 (in Appendix B) on households by size, number of rooms and 
bedrooms as well as other structural characteristics. They confirm that non-nationals in general have 
smaller houses, fewer rooms and bedrooms, fewer houses with piped water and a greater proportion 
shares toilets. Housing quality indicators for Saint Maarten demonstrated in tables C9 to C ll  
confirm the conditions described above: the modal household size for nationals and non-nationals 
is two persons and one person, respectively; the modal number o f  rooms is five and three 
respectively; 30 per cent o f the non-national households do not have toilets; and proportionately, 
11 times more non-nationals use pails as a water source compared to nationals. In the United States 
Virgin Islands, the proportion o f natives in public housing is smaller than that of foreign-born 
residents, but as tables D8 to D12 indicate, the differences in housing are not as extreme as those in 
Saint Maarten17.
l7Housing data classified by nationality were not available for the Bahamas.
4.4.2 Access to education
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As Proposition 187 became the rallying cry ofnativist Californians, it was mainly held aloft 
by “the image o f brown welfare moms streaming across the border to live off taxpayers and populate 
the schools with ‘illegal’ children of another language” (Ojeda and Schey, 1996, 98). The attempt 
was to reduce or cease the provisions o f the major public services to undocumented migrants, the 
primary one being education.
In each of the four countries, the cost o f educating immigrant children is seen as a heavy 
burden on taxpayers. In all of the cases, educators have variously used the protection o f local laws 
to prohibit immigrant children from attending public schools, primarily because their numbers 
outstrip the available supply of classroom space, teachers and other educational resources. In the 
three countries in which governments have been involved in the migratory process or have given 
tacit support to it— the Bahamas suggests it has become an immigrant country to Haitians because 
it is in the direct path to the United States— there is no indication that any plans were developed 
primarily to minister to the educational needs of the children o f expectant temporary immigrants.
4.4.2.1 Saint Maarten
Perhaps the most enlightened approach to the intractable problem of educating 
immigrant children is that expressed by education officials in Saint Maarten. This disposition 
appears to be a direct reaction to the recent realization o f the permanency o f  temporary migration 
and the potential long-term pathologies that are associated with a dispossessed and uneducated 
underclass in their society.
Four categories o f immigrant children were not allowed to attend public schools in 
Saint Maarten: children who are legally entitled, but who could not, because of a language problem, 
age, or the simple lack of school facilities; children of parents who have applied for legal status but 
who are documented.-, children of parents who are illegal residents but who have registered in the 
tent cities18; and children who are residing illegally and have not registered in the tent cities (Hodge, 
Groeneveldt and Harrigan, 1995). While noting that the legal school population of Saint Maarten 
had doubled in the five-year period between 1990 and 1995, and that a large segment of 
Saint Maarten natives “is o f the opinion that Saint Maarten is not in an economically viable position 
to provide education to its large undocumented population”, Harrigan (1995) documents numerous 
problems in education that derive from a large undocumented immigrant population. Table C12 
shows that between 1986 and 1993, the federal contribution to education almost doubled from 
N A fl.l million to NAÍ2.1 million, and local expenditure almost quintupled from NAfS.6 million 
to N A D 8.9 million in the same period. By any measure, this is an enormous effort to meet the needs 
o f education for the burgeoning young population.
l5In the absence o f affordable housing, or in an effort to avoid the authorities, many immigrants occupied shanty towns. Hurricane Luis swept away 
most o f  this temporary housing in 1995, and government bulldozers were sent in to demolish the rest. The government urged these residents to 
occupy, and were accom m odated in, tent cities that were erected as temporary but supervised living quarters.
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In an effort to provide some rudimentary education to immigrant children, eight 
makeshift schools were in existence in 1995, all being managed by immigrants, all recognized as 
illegal, but all allowed to coexist because the government could not provide formal education.
Compulsory education came to Saint Maarten on 1 August 1996 and with it the stark 
realization that the facilities were inadequate to meet the challenge. Harrigan (1995,4-5) states the 
position of one local group:
Granting permission to undocumented individuals to attend school without 
the proper support system to keep them there will burden the system in 
unprecedented ways with underachievers who want to drop out but can’t 
because o f the law ... Dropping out o f school generally has high costs for 
society as well as individuals. On average, dropouts pay less taxes; are more 
likely to be less productive workers, to need welfare assistance, to commit 
crimes and delinquent acts; and are less likely to participate in community 
affairs. Enforcing compulsory education without the proper educational 
infra-structure is detrimental to the existing standard and will lead to chaos.
Recognizing that the education system has never catered to the needs of 
undocumented children, that every child should be given a chance to improve oneself and make 
positive contributions to society, and that it is wiser and cheaper to invest in the education of all 
students, some education officials make the following recommendations. They suggest that the 
requirement o f submitting residency papers by immigrants for entry to the school system be revoked 
immediately, that all illegal schools be discontinued and the structures be demolished, that children 
not now attending school be admitted to government-subsidized schools, and that adequate 
educational facilities be provided for all school-age children. (For one estimate o f partial costs for 
education in Saint Maarten, see table 12 below.) Finally, they point out that in order to be in 
compliance with international treaties regulating fundamental human rights and the rights o f the 
child, government should seek out financial assistance and human resources from national and 
international sources (Hodge et al, 1995). (See table C l3 for educational attainment of 
Saint Maarteners.)
4.4.2.2 The Bahamas
The presence o f Caribbean immigrants and their impact on social services seem to 
evoke a higher level o f exasperation among native Bahamians than among Saint Maarteners. In 
recent years, their ire has focused on the high cost o f educating undocumented children. With an 
increase by 289.8 per cent o f the Haitian population between 1970 and 1980, such costs appear 
inevitable.
The policy o f the Government in 1986 was reported to be one “barring children of 
Haitian immigrants from registration until their parents’ status could be verified” (William, 1995, 
6). This position was challenged by a local human rights association which argued that it violated
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the Education Act and constitutional guarantees, and that “these Haitian children are not responsible 
for their status; to exclude them from Bahamian public schools will stigmatize them by keeping them 
illiterate for the rest of their lives... This continued isolation is also politically unwise, as it will 
result in the creation of a permanent underclass...” (William, 1995, 6).
In 1991, Haitian children constituted 7.4 per cent o f the Bahamas public school 
population. (See table A6 for education attainment levels). With a budget of S106 million, it was 
estimated that it cost the Government $4.2 million to educate Haitian youth: $3.1 million to educate 
2,550 students at the primary level, and $1.1 million for 796 students at the secondary level. “The 
sum spent by the Bahamas government to secure education for the Haitian students, in 1991 alone 
could have built a new Primary or Secondary school to the ‘tune’ o f some S4.2 million”. An 
additional $163,551 was spent on materials and supplies for Haitian children (Stubbs, 1994, 5). 
Over the 10-year period between 1986 and 1995, capital expenditures remained stationary around 
$B7 million, but recurrent expenditure rose by 36 per cent from $B85.5 million (table A7).
In an attempt to reduce the cost to the Bahamas Government for services to Haitians, 
and to raise funds to support the education of their children, Stubbs (1994) proposed levying a 
“migrant tax” and imposing “a special school attendance fee”. He claims that this latter was 
necessary i f  the Bahamas were to maintain a quality education for its youth. Further, he suggested 
that $4.8 million could be realized by assessing an annual fee— or tax— of $120 on all resident 
Haitians for a total o f $4.8 million! And $75 per school year on each Haitian schoolchild for a total 
of $450 per year. No indication was given as to what would become of those children whose parents 
could not afford the tax, nor how to deal with the parents themselves who were too poor to afford 
the “migrant tax”.
4.4.2.3 United States Virgin Islands
By 1960, the number o f school-age children in the United States Virgin Islands 
(between 4 and 19 years) stood at 11,719. Ten years later, pupils in that age group increased by 75 
per cent to 20,497, and by 1980 it was augmented by another 78 per cent to reach 36,427— an overall 
increase from 1960 by 211 per cent. Meanwhile, very few classrooms were added, and the situation 
became increasingly intolerable to natives. Even though the Virgin Islands Department of Education 
did not allow a large number o f immigrant children to attend public school19, natives expressed 
concern about the lowering quality of education caused by the children of foreign-born residents. 
It was reported in 1968 that there were no easy answers to the current problem. “It is not compatible 
with a democratic society to prevent large numbers o f children from attending school. It is 
recommended that the Government of the Virgin Islands forcefully face this problem and make a 
point of requiring all alien children to be enrolled in school” (SERD, 1968, 7).
l9The Virgin Islands Departm ent o f  Education promulgated the regulation that non-citizens o f  school age may be enrolled in public elementary and 
secondary classes, provided that, among other things, they “do not cause the number o f  pupils in any class to exceed prescribed standards” , and 
that they “present satisfactory evidence o f  the inability o f  the off-island guardians to supervise them” (Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, 
and International Law [SICIL], 1975, 33).
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By 1970, two events conspired to overwhelm the education system, such that it was 
several years before a period o f normalcy was restored.
First, the Congress o f the United States enacted Public Law 91-225 to address the 
reunification o f families without reference to the Virgin Islands. The indirect effect was to permit 
family reunification on a massive scale as immigrant parents could now bring in their spouses and 
children. Second, a class-action suit by ‘non-immigrant visitors’ against the Department of 
Education for excluding immigrant children from school found the regulation to be in conflict with 
Virgin Islands Code, as it “imposes unreasonable and invidious discrimination on these plaintiffs 
and all members of their class and thus offends ... the Constitution”. The quote below shows that 
the main defense of the Government related to the cost burden of educating non-immigrant children:
Defendants make much o f the influx of aliens into the territory ... and 
suggest that the cost o f admitting these plaintiffs and all others in the class to 
the public schools would create an undue burden on the Government of the 
Virgin Islands... Fundamental rights ... may be neither denied nor abridged 
solely because their implementation requires the expenditure of public funds.
For such purposes, the Government must raise the funds (SICIL, 1975, 34).
The impact on the public school system was dramatic. In the fall o f 1972,80 per cent 
o f the enrollees were immigrant children, and they also constituted 32.5 per cent o f the total student 
body. ‘Double session’ o f classes at morning for some students and in the afternoon for other 
students was introduced to cope with the large number o f students who outnumbered available seats 
for normal session. More teachers and councilors had to be hired, and the cost o f procuring other 
resources soared. Up until today, the budget of the Department of Education constitutes the largest 
o f all institutions in the entire Government. Recent data show that the operating budget of the 
department increased from SUS63.1 million in 1986 by 75.8 per cent to SUS 111.0 in 1995 (table 
D13; for data on educational attainment, see D14).
4.4.2.4 The British Virgin Islands
While the actual number of immigrants in the British Virgin Islands is the smallest 
in the four countries studied, the associated problems and attendant costs are no less daunting to 
government officials there. In the population census o f 1991, there were about twice as many 
belongers as non-belongers20 between the school ages o f 5 to 19. Immigrants predominate 
throughout the reproductive age range— from 20 to 45— and beyond to age 59, and this is a clear 
indication that it is only a matter o f time before non-national children become the majority in the 
school-age categories.
:cT h e  terms belonger  and non-belonger are com m only used in the British Virgin Islands to refer synonym ously to natives or nationals and non­
nationals respectively.
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Attention appears to be given to the implications for the demand on resources for the 
construction of facilities, as well as on wages and salaries for relevant personnel. In some instances, 
the increasing size on the non-national groups is seen as a threat to the indigenous way of life. Like 
all o f the cases discussed in this section, the British Virgin Islands also places limits on school 
attendance by non-nationals. Priority is given to the children o f belongers, then of government 
contractual workers, o f United States Virgin Islanders, and o f immigrants from the Eastern 
Caribbean. Currently, the Department of Education is unable to place all requests made through 
applications— which all parents must submit. A wait time of two to three years is common for non- 
belonger children. A Ministry of Education official asserts that the ‘double session’ method which 
was introduced in the United States Virgin Islands to accommodate immigrant children in school 
is not an option for British Virgin Islanders. And with a relatively large size of Dominican 
Republican and Haitian non-belonger residents, the language problem o f instruction creates a further 
difficulty for the education system.
New construction projects expected to come on stream soon will likely create a new 
wave o f immigration. And as the Government moves from the discussion stage to implementation 
of family reunion for current immigrants, the size of the non-belonger school-age group is certain 
to surpass that o f  the belonger group. However, with appropriate planning and allocation of 
necessary resources, the British Virgin Islands can avoid the worst aspects of this inherent aspect of 
labour migration such as that experienced by Saint Maarten or the United States Virgin Islands. 
Whether the Government can reasonably absorb these costs in meeting the obligations o f the rights 
of children to an education can only be answered by the Government itself.
4.4.3 Health
An industrial society cannot function on an even keel and at an efficient level when 
large groups o f people are denied access to social welfare programmes. A minimum 
programme of social services should be implemented for aliens. This should include 
emergency welfare services and adequate health care [SERD, 1968, 51].
This comment, made in respect o f the United States Virgin Islands, applies generally to each 
of the countries under study. Each one provides health services to its immigrants, in varying 
degrees, but there is evidence that in at least two countries the burden of that cost has become so 
onerous that external assistance is sought to assuage the strain. There appears to be a direct 
relationship between the size of the undocumented migrant force and the overall cost of health 
services in the receiving country. One primary reason is that legal immigrants are normally 
expected to demonstrate at point of entry that they are not carrying “loathsome or contagious 
diseases” (as required by the United States in 1891), and “that they are not likely at any time to 
become a public charge”21 (Wolchok, 1996, 136). It is the fiscal crisis which partly motivated 
support for Proposition 187 in California which “limits the provisions of public services and of
:lA public charge includes anyone who depends on public support because he or she is unable to provide support for oneself, does not have a 
communicable disease, nor a physical or mental disability.
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public-funded healthcare only to those persons who are citizens of the United States or are lawfully 
admitted aliens” (Ojeda and Schey, 1996).
Comments from healthcare providers in the countries under consideration here suggest 
similar concerns as those raised currently in the United States which is now considering reform of 
its healthcare policy as part o f its budget reduction process. Discussion o f the cost of medical 
services is directly linked to a review o f immigration policies by the Congress. A coalition o f health, 
civil rights and immigration organizations has asserted that a system that denies healthcare to 
immigrants would not produce significant cost savings o f this service. However, it made 
recommendations that would diminish the linguistic and cultural barriers which often discourage 
newcomers. However, while Congressional budget officers indicate that some $17.5 billion would 
be saved over five years by excluding immigrants from assistance, public health practitioners take 
another view. They are almost unanimous in their argument that to deny immigrants’ access to 
government-supported public-health programmes is a myopic strategy. They further state 
(Wolchok, 1996, 137):
Many immigrants—both legal and illegal— are unfamiliar with the health delivery 
system, cannot afford private medical care or insurance, encounter language barriers 
to accessing healthcare, and may avoid using available services for fear of detection.
As a result, they often neglect preventative healthcare, are more likely to delay 
treatment until their medical problems have advanced to more acute stages when 
more expensive interventions are necessary, and may turn to unlicensed healthcare 
providers. Denying non-emergency public health services ... is almost certain to ... 
increase the public health risks at a time when tuberculosis, parasitic infections, and 
hepatitis are rising within the immigrant community.
With the exception o f the British Virgin Islands, the other receiving countries all indicate 
enormous public expenditure in trying to cope with the demand for immigrant healthcare services.
4.4.3.1 The Bahamas
In the Bahamas, the cost o f health services is one of the issues to which reference is 
made as “the national burden resulting from many of Haiti’s nationals illegally residing in the 
Bahamas”22. An overall upward trend in the per cent of registered live births by Haitian mothers in 
the Bahamas during the years 1987 to 1991 is reflected in the following: 7.8,9.9,12.2,11.8 and 13.4 
per cent in respective years. These appear to exceed the per cent o f Haitians in the Bahamian 
population at large, and constitute one more reason Bahamians are uneasy with the growth in the 
number o f Haitians. In 1991, the national health allocation for services to Haitians was $21.4 
million (Stubbs, 1994).
:The source is a 1994 m em orandum  from the M inistry o f  Foreign Affairs to the Ministry o f  Health, Bahamas.
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Stubbs noted that “the impact o f the Haitians on health care service in the Bahamas 
is tremendous”. He points out that in 1984, Haitians made up 9 per cent and 10 per cent of in­
patients and out-patients respectively on Grand Bahama. In addition, he lists a number of hospitals 
and clinics that provided health services to Haitians that range from 13 per cent Haitian for out­
patient and emergency room care at the Princess Margaret Hospital, to 72.5 per cent for child health 
and antenatal services at Carmichael Road Clinic. And to meet these “great demands” that non­
nationals place on the healthcare system of the Bahamas, he again suggests that “to adequately meet 
this somewhat recurring demand, it is imperative that a special health tax be imposed on these 
nationals (the Haitians) if  services are to be met timely and adequately.”
Health officials express genuine concern in respect of the level of infectious diseases 
found among Haitians, particularly those who are undocumented. One third o f all new cases of 
tuberculosis between 1987 and 1992 were Haitians, and this is viewed with concern because of the 
length o f time and cost associated with treating it. They also comprised 32 per cent of the typhoid 
fever cases between 1984 and 1992. The three leading causes o f death among Haitians were 
pneumonia, influenza, injuries and intestinal infections. By 1993, 70 per cent of persons identified 
as HIV positive were non-nationals, and the overwhelming proportion of these were said to be 
Haitian. While 2 out o f 100 Bahamian mothers are HIV positive, it is 5 out of 100 for Haitian 
mothers. The Bahamas does not now have any known cases o f malaria, but there is a perceived 
constant threat o f it being reintroduced by Haitians because o f the prevalence of this disease in 
Haiti23.
In the report detailing these effects on Bahamian health and welfare systems, it is 
stated that the cost o f providing humanitarian relief is “overbearing for a small country... We 
recommend that an appeal be made for significant assistance from the United Nations and regional 
organizations to assist us in our efforts”. National allocations to health services increased 40.7 from 
SB69.3 in 1986 to SB97.4 in 1995 (table A7).
4.4.3.2 Saint Maarten
There is general agreement in Saint Maarten that healthcare services are relatively 
expensive, definitely much more so than those in French Saint Martin (which shares the same 
island). In order to put healthcare within the reach of Antillean nationals, a system o f medical 
insurance provides a safety net. Employers contribute to this insurance system on behalf of 
registered employees.
The plight of unregistered immigrant workers is put forth by Wyatt (1995) and 
Larmonie (1995). The basic theme is that while immigrants theoretically have direct access to 
healthcare services, they are often at great disadvantage, and they risk their personal health because 
o f the severe limitations they face. This in turn means that they are subject to a greater variety of 
maladies which often result in shorter life spans.
:3Source: a 1994 report prepared by the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs, Bahamas.
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Because o f the undocumented status of many immigrants, the social security 
premiums withheld by their employers are often not paid in. The worker generally has no way of 
knowing this, and is incapable o f  ensuring that it is paid on his or her behalf. The direct consequence 
of this is that the immigrant has no medical insurance, and “has no access to the local government’s 
healthcare system for the poor. That access is an exclusive privilege o f the Antillean citizen” 
(Larmonie, 1995, 5). When faced with a medical emergency in Saint Maarten, where strict pre­
payment rules for emergency-room services are applied, the immigrant without health insurance 
crosses the border into French Saint Martin where the services are notably cheaper. This only serves 
to overburden the limited capabilities of the medical services in the French sector.
Two Saint Maarten physicians commented on the healthcare system by first noting 
that there is an uncollectable debt from immigrants ofN A f 3.5 million over a five-year period (table 
12). They affirm that most immigrants are uninsured, and most wait until an emergency situation 
develops before care is sought. This not only increases the cost of the treatment, but is often too late 
for preventive help. An estimate o f overall health and associated costs (of education and welfare 
services) is given in table 12 (C.H. Dijkman, personal communication, 19 December, 1995).
The table shows that o f the NAf 3.5 million of unrecoverable cost, 2.5 million were 
related to insurance, and 1 million for other health services. Ideally, these physicians who handle 
most o f the immigrant cases suggest that one practical solution is to employ at least two physicians 
and two social workers— with housing and transport— who are versed in the vernacular of the 
Haitians and Dominican Republicans. These specialists would work in the field among immigrants 
at their homes or places o f work. However, the cost of this proactive approach o f N A f 2.25 million 
annually is beyond the means o f their department. Their recommendation is that this be supported 
by external aid agencies primarily to improve healthcare among immigrants in Saint Maarten, and 
relieve the enormous strain on the French health services on the island.
4.4.3.3 United States Virgin Islands
As in the United States, applicants for permanent residency to the United States 
Virgin Islands are required to complete a physical examination. The majority o f residents in the 
United States Virgin Islands during the 1960s and 1970s were bonded. Since their status was 
considered temporary, they were not obliged to undergo physical examinations or meet any other 
health requirements. At one point, it was suggested that because “bonded aliens ... bring with them 
contagious diseases and health problems” they should also be required to complete the same physical 
examination as required for those who seek permanent residency status (SERD, 1968, 9).
Prior to 1966, non-nationals in the United States Virgin Islands were denied access 
to a 50 per cent discount on all health services from which citizens benefited. When these 
restrictions were eliminated, the costs were assumed by the local government. While no specific
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data were available on the expenditures of the health services during the 1960s and 1970s, nor on 
the direct contribution of immigrants to the overall debt, the following provide an indication of costs 
in 1967 during a period of heavy migration growth (SERD, 1969):
• By 1966, the policy of the Department of Health was to provide emergency 
health treatment to anyone, regardless of status or financial capability to pay.
• About one third o f hospital patients were non-citizens, with one half of them 
claiming visitor status.
• Almost half o f the live births were to immigrant mothers.
• About 62 per cent o f the fetal deaths were to mothers bom outside the United 
States Virgin Islands.
• Health problems associated with inadequate water supplies, poor housing and 
sewage disposal facilities appeared to be more common among immigrants.
Department o f Health officials indicate that in the 1980s and 1990s, the number of 
non-immigrant females who come to the Virgin Islands primarily to give birth to their babies has 
increased. Apart from taking advantage o f free basic health services relating to the birth of children, 
the mothers find it advantageous to have their children acquire United States citizenship by virtue 
of being bom in a territory o f the United States (see section 4.2.4 above). The total operating costs 
for the health services areas increased by 91.4 per cent from SUS35.8 million in 1986 to SUS68.6 
in 1995 (table D 12).
4.5 Political
Historically, many countries have placed economic and political limitations on the 
participation of immigrants on the basis of their race, religion or nationality. However, within the 
last 30 years, there has been a gradual extension of rights to migrant ethnic minorities within the 
advanced industrial societies— and by extension, in their dependencies. These developments have 
much more dramatic effects on microstates than they do on métropoles.
Nowhere in the United States— the primary receiving country in the hemisphere— is there 
any evidence that political movements are founded on ethnic groups, nor any to suggest strong 
influence on foreign policy. Further yet, there is no information that any immigrant ethnic groups 
have sought to change the basic political institutions of any country in the western hemisphere. Y et 
in each o f the countries under study, there is deep-seated apprehension about the long-term effects 
of migrants on the political life of their native lands. One response to that anxiety states (Simon, 
1996, 67):
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...When voluntary immigration is the major source of a society’s ethnic and cultural 
heterogeneity,... the diverse ethnic, racial and religious groups are likely to identify 
with the political community and are not likely to seek to destabilize or disrupt it.
Most immigrants came ... to seek a better life. They sought relief from economic, 
political and religious distress. They found the freedom to accumulate wealth, to 
pursue their religion, and to gain full political rights of citizenship.
Ethnic minorities within the receiving countries studied are characterized by common origins, 
history, culture, experience and political background. Ethnicity by itself as expressed through 
cultural practices is hardly o f any political significance, but when groups begin to take on coherence 
and develop organized units for their self-expression, they present threats to nationals. In each of 
the four cases, the immigrant ethnic minority suffers a degree o f marginalisation or exclusion, and 
thus embodies the potential for social and political conflict. Nationals therefore resort to political 
closure, a process by which the status group establishes implicit rather than explicit criteria by which 
ethnic minorities are excluded in the retention o f political power.
Perhaps the greatest expression of the perceived political impact o f immigrants maybe drawn 
from the case o f the United States Virgin Islands. At the height of its migration experience, the 
United States Virgin Islands had a larger immigrant ethnic minority than any of the other countries. 
Moreover, United States immigration laws make it less difficult for foreigners to become citizens 
and participate in the political process than any o f the other countries. But underlying the theme of 
politics was the abiding fear, expressed publicly in several forms, that the last bastion of patrimony 
in the form o f political power would somehow be wrested from nationals.
The deteriorating economic conditions and the increase of the unemployment rate in the early 
1970s helped to focus attention on the political implications o f the presence of the large number of 
“temporary” workers in the United States Virgin Islands. In May 1970, it was stated that “more than 
40 per cent o f the Virgin Islands labour force was barred from full participation in the political and 
social life o f the Islands because o f their nonimmigrant status” (SICIL, 1975, 36). The political 
implications were that there was no sense o f urgency in granting permanent residence—and 
ultimately citizenship and the right to vote— to this large number of immigrants, because it “would 
in all probability cost those who are now citizens, including the native-born population, political 
control o f the islands” (SICIL, 1975, 17). One of the major findings in a congressional report 
relative to the effect o f immigrants in the Virgin Islands was that there was “serious concern among 
native Virgin Islanders and elected officials that regularizing the status o f H aliens will eventually 
lead to the loss o f political control o f the islands” (SICIL, 1975, 51).
Despite the fact that a commissioned study of the migrant problem recommended that “the 
most basic problem that must have attention from Federal and Virgin Islands agencies and the people 
of the Virgin Islands is that it is completely inimical to the democratic process to cut off so 
completely from participation in society a group such as the aliens” (SERD, 1969, 7), government 
officials responded in 1971 to the demands for the expulsion o f immigrants by summarily deporting
8,000 undocumented workers. In testimony before the United States Department o f Justice in 1978,
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a representative o f the Governor testified to the “increased fears by the indigenous population of 
political domination from without”, and of the “trends that are threatening to overwhelm native 
Virgin Islanders and to remove them from their one remaining position o f control: operation of the 
local government” (Collins, 1978, 12).
Forty years after the period of recent migration began, United States Virgin Islanders have 
not lost, nor are they about to lose, political control of their islands. The first foreign-bom nominee 
for a cabinet position was rejected by the legislature in 1975, but as most bonded immigrants were 
regularized in 1983 and have become voters, the situation of political integration and participation 
has improved markedly. The first foreign-bom senators were elected in the 1990s, and there are 
three current members of the Governor’s cabinet who are of Eastern Caribbean origin. Political 
control by denizens o f foreign stock has not materialized.
4.6 Incorporation and ethnic diversity
The ethnic diversity o f migrants impacts on receiving societies in many ways. Perhaps the 
most significant are issues that relate to political participation, cultural pluralism and national 
identity. Newcomers tend to exert trends o f increasing diversity on the societies of immigrant 
countries, and they are usually distinct from the resident nationals. Immigrants’ baggage often 
include different traditions, political institutions, language, style o f dress, religion and other cultural 
behaviors. It is this aspect o f a new cultural diversity and its impact on social structures which often 
bring into question the matter of national identity.
Nationals expressed varying degrees o f threat on the issue of diversity. In each case, the 
increasing size o f the immigrant stock induces conditions of life for natives which appear to change 
in unpredictable ways, and these in turn cause the nationals to identify the immigrants with their 
insecurity. The xenophobia that was sometimes evident appears to be the result o f a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Its justification lies in the way the outsiders are cast as socially and culturally alien who 
will, with time, want to take over the areas in which they live. By implicitly denying access to 
adequate housing, immigrants are forced to live together—albeit in poor housing— for mutual 
protection, and this creates the very visible concentration o f ethnic enclaves that the natives want to 
prevent. The newcomers are perceived as contributing to a lowering of living standards, as a 
disruption to life styles and as eroding the social cohesion that predated their arrival. It is likely, 
then, “that native-born populations will continue to press for restrictive measures out of fear that the 
‘core culture’ of their nation is being assaulted, diluted, or transformed to an unacceptable degree 
by culturally distinct immigrants” (Cornelius et al., 1994, 37).
It is evident that as permanent migration has taken place, cultural forms have become 
diversified, and varying forms of migrant incorporation have evolved. What is also observed in the 
four societies is that none has explicitly identified the type of migrant incorporation that it wants for 
its permanent immigrants. The type that evolves— among assimilation, integration, exclusion or 
multiculturalism— is therefore largely a function of the rules of the society that govern citizenship, 
and the degree o f ethnic and cultural homogeneity that it wants to— or can—preserve. In the final
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analysis, both increasing ethnic diversity and incorporation inevitably require significant political 
and psychological adjustments in all o f the migrant-receiving societies.
4.6.1 The Haitian challenge in the Bahamas
The largest ethnic minority in the Bahamas is Haitian—followed by Jamaicans and Chinese. 
Haitians have been described as hard-working and industrious, and perform jobs that many 
Bahamians will not do, including agricultural work, construction, tailoring, masonry and fishing. 
They are cited for their worker reliability and scrupulous honesty. Bahamians will readily hire them 
to perform domestic house or yard services. Their crime rate is rather low, except for domestic 
violence. But most importantly, they do not appear to pose any threat to the political order of the 
Bahamas.
On the other hand, the large number o f Haitians poses an oft-described threat to the ethnic 
and cultural homogeneity with which Bahamians perceive their country. The migrants from Haiti 
are accused o f tenaciously clinging to their patois language and creating a problem of instruction for 
Haitian pupils in school. Annoyance is expressed at their preference for their ethnic drink taffir and 
for their love of poquino, a gambling game. It is also claimed that their community is rife with 
illiteracy, the production of illegal bush alcohol, prostitution, gambling and drug running by 
juveniles. But even as Bahamian-bom Haitians achieve social mobility to the top as lawyers and as 
police officers, there is still fear that they will subvert the social and political system to that of their 
Haitian-bom parents. This psychological disquietude does not appear to be grounded in prior 
experience, but seems to be more emotionally grounded and vicarious in nature.
4.6.2 The British Virgin Islands faces cultural differences
There appears to be no ambiguity in the British Virgin Islands concerning the need for 
temporary immigrants to provide the labour that drives the economy. Dominicans— from the 
Dominican Republic— and Guyanese are the choice of employers because they are readily available, 
are skilled, and their labour is cheapest in the market place. They fill the construction and low-level 
service jobs that British Virgin Islands belongers abandon for government, banks, trusts, other office 
jobs and hotels.
Because o f the relative smallness o f the British Virgin Islands community and the 
interrelationships between natives and immigrants, belongers are less publicly outspoken about the 
impact o f foreigners on their culture. However, one government official perceives the major 
challenge to be the protection o f the patrimony from the newcomers. It is particularly irksome that 
some British Virgin Islands-bom children o f immigrants consider themselves as belongers. Another 
concern was that long-term immigration would introduce teachers into the system who may not share 
British Virgin Islands values, thereby eroding the very sociocultural foundation that defines the 
British Virgin Islands society to be what it is. Dominicans are accused o f fervently retaining their 
Spanish language, and this creates problems o f communication at all levels for belongers. Natives 
point out that many Dominican Republican women are involved in prostitution, but there appears
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to be very little willingness to deal with it officially. The clannishness of Dominicans is described 
as discomforting: they patronize their own bars, drink their own beer, play their own sports, and 
perhaps most grating, they make no effort to integrate. In a final condescending act, it is alleged, 
they retain their Spanish language and Dominican Republican values as culturally superior to that 
of their hosts. Citizenship is extremely difficult to acquire, and in this respect, permanent 
immigrants have exerted very little influence on the political life o f British Virgin Islanders.
4.6.3 Ethnic and cultural diversity in Saint Maarten
The population of Saint Maarten is probably more diverse than that o f any of the other 
countries studied. This is largely explained by the fact that it is one o f thq fam ily islands of the 
Netherlands Antilles where the Dutch and papiamento languages are primary. Its shared location 
of an island with a French neighbour, together with its geographic position in proximity to English- 
speaking islands as sources of immigrants, further increases that diversity. And in recent years, 
because of the influx of Spanish-speaking Dominicans and patois-speaking Haitians, its diverse 
population elements have increased even further.
The value o f denizens to the economy of Saint Maarten—in which about 70 per cent is 
foreign— is fully recognized by most Saint Maarteners. However, there is no concomitant 
recognition o f the inevitability o f the adjustment that nationals have to make in the face of the impact 
o f such different ethnic groups on their culture.
The incorporation o f immigrants from the Eastern Caribbean has been in progress for more 
than 50 years, and the recency of Haitians and Dominicans presents the greatest difficulty to which 
Saint Maarteners must adjust. As in the Bahamas and the other islands, Haitians in Saint Maarten 
are described as going to extraordinary lengths to learn English and to teach it to their children. This 
is certainly o f assistance to school-age children in reducing the communications problems associated 
with Dominicans. Their reputation for hard and honest work is also here preserved. Family life is 
marked by a seeming pattern for males not wanting their women to work, and the family as a social 
unit appears strong.
Dominican Republicans are identified as the immigrant group exerting the most inimical 
influence on Saint Maarten society. The tendency to insist on the use of their language in 
communicating with non-Dominicans exasperates Saint Maarteners, particularly when Haitians are 
observed in making efforts to speak the prevailing language. Some cultural habits are considered 
irksome: for example, the nonchalant disposal of their garbage, or the indifference shown to 
neighbours by playing their foreign music loudly for 24 hours, including Sundays. Family life 
among Dominicans is seen to be dysfunctional: reference is made to the injurious treatment of 
children and to the abusive relationship that males have with their females. They also appear to run 
afoul of the law more often that other immigrants. However, some o f the strongest expressions are 
reserved for the effects that Dominican females are exerting on Saint Maarten.
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A focus group o f Saint Maarteners24 excoriate Dominican women for their role in houses of 
prostitution— some houses are “legal”, but there appears to be tacit connivance with “illegal” ones. 
Male Saint Maarteners are described as demonstrating a preference for female Dominicans who have 
“straight hair” and are “more fair” in complexion than native females, and also for those who are 
more “shapely”. “Dark” female Dominicans do not appear to be sought after with the same passion. 
Particularly vexatious because o f the potential for severe family discord is the practice of the 
adoption o f Dominican children by male Saint Maarteners. It was pointed out that some of these 
men accept payment from Dominican mothers for the adoption of one or more of their children. The 
advantage to the mother is that this extends certain rights to the youth, and by extension, to the 
mother. Females with children fathered by native men must first get— and they make every effort 
to get— these fathers to “acknowledge” their children, with the consequent naturalization o f the child 
and concomitant rights. These practices seem to be creating anxiety among some Saint Maarten 
spouses and others who see their family estate as now shared by totally unrecognized strangers. At 
the moment it appears that only native females are expressing concern, but the potential for social 
disharmony exists when the estates of these males have to be probated.
4.6.4 Incorporation in the United States Virgin Islands
Perhaps the primary difference in the process o f migration between the United States Virgin 
Islands and the other migrant-receiving countries in this report is that children of foreigners bom in 
the United States Virgin Islands, irrespective o f their immigration status, automatically accede to 
United States citizenship with all the rights and privileges that this status confers— ius soli. 
However, the overwhelming majority of immigrants who entered the United States Virgin Islands, 
documented or undocumented, were defined by law to be “temporary”, and were indeed so treated 
by federal and local government agencies as well as by natives of the islands. It is primarily because 
o f this persistent belief in the temporary nature o f the residency of immigrants in the face of the 
reality o f non-legal permanent residence that incorporation of migrants into the United States Virgin 
Islands is so different from that which prevailed in the United States before the recent massive 
immigration.
Even though the majority o f immigrants to the United States Virgin Islands are linguistically, 
ethnically and culturally similar in most respects to United States Virgin Islanders, the incorporation 
o f migrants does not approximate that of the traditional melting p o t variety in the United States of 
Europeans into that society. This type of incorporation— or more precisely, assimilation—is defined 
as the adaptation to the local community of migrants by which they become homogeneous with, or 
indistinguishable from, the majority. Rather, what prevails in the United States Virgin Islands is 
more o f a salad bowl that may be termed multicultural or pluralistic. This implies a society that is 
composed o f different ethnic and racial groups that retain certain distinguishable characteristics from 
the host, but which are granted equal rights in most spheres of life.
:4Members o f  the group included physicians and sta ff from the Department o f Health, officials from the Department o f  Social Health, the Social 
Unit (o f Education) and the Departm ent o f  Social and Labour Affairs.
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For the 26-year period between 1955 up until the Alien Adjustment Act o f the United States 
regularized the majority of bonded and undocumented workers in the United States Virgin Islands, 
the foreign-born coexisted with natives in an uncertain state o f incorporation. The status of 
immigrants being “on bond” kept the idea of their eventual repatriation alive for natives, but when 
the Alien Adjustment Act of 1981 virtually ensured that the majority of foreigners would retain long­
term residency in the United States Virgin Islands, multiculturalism appeared to be the apt descriptor 
of migrant incorporation rather than assimilation. Immigrants have been chastised for adhering to 
some elements of the culture of their homeland, but it is precisely the many expressions o f not being 
wanted, together with their uncertain migration status, that prompted immigrants to retain the belief 
that at some appropriate time they would return home to retire or to die, and therefore justified their 
adherence to their ethnic and cultural identity.
Meanwhile, the use of the word alien— as distinct from its judicial meaning—by natives to 
describe foreigners, particularly from the Eastern Caribbean, is considered by immigrants to imply 
contempt. However, in the improved atmosphere of the 1990s, it is regarded to be in extremely poor 
taste to use it in public. While the term is not legally applicable to the whole second generation of 
children of immigrants bom in the United States Virgin Islands, there still persists a degree of 
association between the sociocultural use o f the word and native-born children o f immigrants.
From the days o f massive migration in the early 1960s, immigrants were held responsible 
for a number o f social ills. In addition to those described above relative to education, health and 
social services, housing, depression of wages and potential inimical impact on local politics, 
immigrants have sometimes been held culpable o f the erosion of traditional United States Virgin 
Islands cultural values. At the same time, however, more liberal thinking ascribes some measure of 
positive impact by immigrants on local culture by the introduction of cricket, soccer, the steelband, 
“mocko jumbie”— a festival event— and certain types of Caribbean cuisine.
The incorporation o f migrants into United States Virgin Islands culture did not, and is not 
taking, the route epitomised in the American Dream. Rather, the processes o f marginalisation and 
isolation at the beginning of the migration cycle have created a multicultural society with which the 
majority natives have to live. In the final analysis, this kind of incorporation literally requires major 
political and psychological adjustments if  the ethnic groups will not form an unassimilable 
underclass, and if  they all are to move harmoniously and productively into the twenty-first century.
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The evidence provided in section four above makes clear that various aspects o f migration 
present two major challenges to these Caribbean receiving countries. The first is: how to manage 
the flow of migrants. The second: having allowed— or having failed to prevent the entry 
of—migrants into one’s country, how should they be treated? What rights— civil, social and 
political— should they be allowed? What form of incorporation o f these newcomers should be 
adopted? Should they be assimilated or incorporated? Or should they be deported if  they are 
undocumented?
Recognizing that the migratory process to a particular receiving country needs to be viewed, 
not in isolation, but as part of a complex system o f socioeconomic interactions within a broad scope 
of institutional structures in countries of origin and destination, the following perspectives are 
offered.
Three primary means for reducing migration pressures in the advanced countries have been 
put forward (Martin, 1996). The economic policies which they adopt and the protection accorded 
to human rights will strongly influence the pressures they will face. The economic instruments that 
can be used to control migration that is economically motivated are: trade, investment, and aid. A 
fourth non-economic measure that is sometimes applied by advanced immigrant countries is that of 
political or military intervention in the sending country. By and large, these methods are beyond the 
current capabilities o f each o f the four microstates, and they must perforce adopt other measures to 
control their own futures.
The immutable law o f immigration asserts that there is nothing more permanent than 
temporary workers! The experience in the advanced industrial societies— and shown to be the case 
in the Caribbean— is that as long as there are temporary or guest workers in a country for any 
reasonable length o f time, networks inevitably become established, and they extend themselves 
readily with modem communications.
Governments cannot expect to control the flow of migrants if  the process is left up to 
employers. Varying degrees o f monitoring by government agencies occur, but in no case did it 
appear that control was adequate. When employers reap the profits o f cheap labour but contribute 
little or nothing to workmen’s compensation or health insurance, the burden falls on all taxpayers. 
The fundamental consideration here is that the objectives of employers are largely different from 
those o f the government which has a responsibility to its entire society.
The following recommendations are put forth for consideration when strategic plans for 




(a) Given the permanency that is associated with temporary migration in receiving 
countries, population control efforts must transcend family planning. Each country 
should establish an immigration agency with the specific function of working with 
other relevant government offices to manage immigration issues, and it should be 
supported with the requisite authority to enable it to implement its mandate.
(b) Uncontrolled immigration has the capacity to distort normal demographic patterns, 
and an immigration agency should be equipped to constantly monitor the 
characteristics o f migrants.
(c) While employers may contribute to the establishment o f the need for migrant labour, 
their role should be limited, and they should not be a part o f the recruitment process.
(d) In countries where immigrants have higher fertility levels, special attention should 
be given to the necessary adjustments that are needed when planning for public 
services.
(e) Countries which practice ius sanguinis, and which promote single-sex migration, 
should give thoughtful consideration to family reunification and family migration. 
Equal consideration should be given to a meaningful plan that incorporates the 
cohorts of offspring who otherwise become permanent residents without a sense of 
belonging.
(f) Unprotected borders, particularly in archipelagoes, facilitate undocumented 
migration which can derail carefully developed socioeconomic planning. The 
enormous costs involved in border protection should be partly supported by 
international assistance.
(g) The impact o f immigrants on microstates is too important an issue to be treated in an 
ad hoc way, and it is strongly recommended that efforts be devoted to a methodic and 
continual programme of the collection and analysis o f migrant data.
5.2 Economic
(a) If  the savings rate of temporary and/or recent migrants is notably higher than that of
natives, and if  much o f these savings are repatriated to families, imaginative 
measures ought to be developed that would retain migrants’ savings for investment 
in the local economy.
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(b) There is little or no conviction among recent immigrants that employers pay fair 
wages, or make required deposits to their social security schemes. An immigration 
agency should be empowered to ensure that all benefits are appropriately set aside 
for all migrant workers.
(c) The effect o f youthful and middle-age migrants in the workforce is to reduce the age 
dependency and economic dependency ratios. The delayed impact of these cohorts 
should be closely monitored because of the effect that will manifest itself years later 
when these migrants become eligible—together with natives— for social and other 
benefits o f the retired and the elderly.
(d) In general, economic growth results from the use of cheaper foreign labour, and it 
raises the standard o f living for the host country. But natives should be publicly 
educated to the fact that a part of the profits derived are in fact costs delayed, and that 
the debt cannot be paid by deporting migrants during economic recessions.
5.3 Social welfare
Housing, education and health services are among the most costly programmes associated 
with migrant labour, but resolute action in anticipation of future problems can substantially reduce 
costs.
(a) Bonding o f immigrants generally requires employers to provide adequate housing, 
but there appears to be little enforcement o f this provision, thereby passing the costs 
o f government-sponsored housing programmes on to local taxpayers. The 
immigration agency should be equipped to enforce the terms of the bond, thus 
removing the worst abuses o f low-quality housing and infrastructural overload.
(b) There is nothing in social policy that justifies the deliberate denial to children of the 
right to public education. An uneducated underclass o f unassimilable immigrants 
poses so many real threats to a modem society that a host country should recognise 
the education o f  migrants as an investment in human capital, and should actively 
provide basic education to all its youth.
(c) Evidence suggests that undocumented migration can put severe strain on planned 
education programmes, and in cases where this threatens to overwhelm receiving 
countries, international agencies should be called upon to assist.
(d) Higher fertility rates, higher median ages and unscreened undocumented migrants, 
possibly with diseases, suggest the need for more health services to immigrants than 
to natives. Planning for these needs is also immensely costly, some associated 




Western democratic societies are not at liberty to regard migrants as mere providers of 
labour, and must come to terms with the “trilogy” of rights— civic, political and social—that must 
be accorded denizens for their wholesome participation in the political process.
5.5 C ultural
Citizenship by descent from parents who are citizens, or through birth in the country, largely 
determines the kind o f migrant incorporation that each country espouses. The former tends to 
exclude some migrants and marginalize others, while the latter allows the creation of a multicultural 
society. None of the countries studied has enunciated the kind of incorporation it wants for its 
foreign-born residents.
Because cultural incorporation affects the social and political status of immigrants, and 
because today’s migrant stream is so ethnically diverse and represents powerful elements for social 
and cultural change, it is fundamentally important that the government or its surrogate, an 
immigration agency, announce clearly its policy on the kind of incorporation it wants for its foreign- 
born residents.
Finally, whatever is the mechanism for overseeing the strategic planning of a rational 
immigration policy, there is no circumvention of two major challenges that must be confronted in 
a migrant receiving country.
The first is to put in place effective means o f managing the flow of immigrants into the 
country. The second is the promotion of a declared policy whose aim is to harmoniously integrate 
migrants into the fabric of society.
52
REFERENCES
Calavita, K. (1994). United States Immigration and Policy Responses: The Limits of 
Legislation. In Cornelius, W.A., P.L. Martin & J.F. Hollifield (Eds.), Controlling Immigration: 
A Global Perspective  (pp. 55-82). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Castles, S., & M.J. Miller. (1993). The Age o f  Migration: International Population 
Movements in the Modern World. NY : The Guilford Press.
Collins, J.P. (1978). The Governor o f  the United States Virgin Islands ’ Immigration Policy 
Task Force to the Immigration Policy Workshop. Statement before the United States Department 
o f Justice, Washington, D.C.
Day, A.T., & L.H. Day. (1987). Cross-National Comparison o f Population Density. In 
Menard, S.W. & E.W. Moen (Eds.), Perspectives on Population: An Introduction to Concepts and 
Issues (pp. 342-352). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Enchautegui, M.E. (1994). Impacts of Immigrants on Employment and Wage Growth: 
Evidence of Positive Effects of United States Immigration. 1994 Proceedings o f  the Social Statistics 
Section. American Statistical Association, 30-38.
Garcia y Griego, M. (1994). Canada: Flexibility and Control in Immigration and Refugee 
Policy. In Cornelius, W.A., P.L. Martin & J.F. Hollifield (Eds.), Controlling Immigration: A 
Global Perspective (pp. 119-140). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Guengant, J-P. (1993). Whither the Caribbean Exodus?: Prospects for the 1990s. 
International Journal, XLVIII, 335-353.
Guengant, J-P. (1996). Emerging Trade Blocks and Caribbean Emigration. In Simmons, 
A.B. (Ed.), International Migration, Refugee Flows and Human Rights in North America: The 
Impact o f  Trade and Restructuring (pp. 123-136). New York, NY: Center for Migration Studies.
Hollifield, J.F. (1994). Immigration and Republicanism in France: The Hidden Consensus. 
In Cornelius, W.A., P.L. Martin & J.F. Hollifield (Eds.), Controlling Immigration: A Global 
Perspective (pp. 143-175). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Harrigan, N.E. (1972). Higher Education in the Microstate: A theory o f  Raran Society. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Harrigan, Q. (1995). Compulsory Education and Immigrant Children. Paper presented at 
the twentieth Annual Conference o f the Caribbean Studies Association, Curacao, Netherlands 
Antilles.
53
Hodge, S., R. Groeneveldt & Q. Harrigan. (1995). Policy Paper on The Educational Status 
o f  Documented and Undocumented Immigrant Children Not Attending School on Saint Maarten. 
Philipsburg, Saint Maarten.
Kopinak, K. (1996). Household, Gender and Migration in Mexican Maquiladoras: The Case 
o f Nogales. In Simmons, A.B. (Ed.), International Migration, Refugee Flows and Human Rights 
in North America: The Impact o f  Trade and Restructuring (pp. 214-228). New Y ork, NY : Center 
for Migration Studies.
Kritz,M.M. (1983). International Migration Patterns in the Caribbean Basin: An Overview. 
In Kritz, M.M., C.B. Keely & M. Tomasi (Eds.), Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research 
on International Population Movements (pp. 208-233). Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration 
Studies.
Larmonie, M.J. (1995, May). Immigrants and Human Rights: Intra-Caribbean Migration 
in Saint Maarten, Netherlands Antilles. Paper presented at the twentieth Annual Conference of the 
Caribbean Studies Association, Curacao, Netherlands Antilles.
Layton-Henry, Z. (1994). Britain: The Would-be Zero-Immigration Country. In Cornelius, 
W.A., P.L. Martin & J.F. Hollifield (Eds.), Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective (pp. 
273-295). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Lucas, R.E.B. (1983). International Migration: Economic Causes, Consequences and 
Evaluation. In Kritz. M.M., C.B. Keely & S.M. Tomasi (Eds.), Global Trends in Migration: 
Theory and Research on International Population Movements (pp. 84-109). Staten Island, NY: 
Center for Migration Studies.
Martin, P., & Midgley, E. (1994). Immigration to the United States: Journey to an 
Uncertain Destination, 49(2). Washington, DC: Population Reference Bureau, Inc.).
Martin, P.L. (1994). Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration. In Cornelius, W.A., P.L. 
Martin & J.F. Hollifield (Eds.), Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective (pp. 189-225). 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Martin, P. & J. Widgren. (1996). International Migration: A Global Challenge. Population 
Bulletin, 51(1).
Mills, F.L. (1988). Determinants and Consequences of the Migration Culture of Saint Kitts- 
Nevis. In Pessar, P.R. (Ed.), When Borders D on ’t Divide: Labor Migration and Refugee 
Movements in the Americas (pp. 42-72).
54
Miller, M.J. & W. W. Boyer. (1980). Foreign Workers in the United States Virgin Islands: 
Lessons fo r  the United States. Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, Washington, DC.
Ojeda, R.H. & P. Schey (1996). Manifest Destiny’s Last Stand? Proposition 187 and the 
Future o f North American Labor and Human Rights. In Tomasi, L.F. (Ed.), In Defense o f  the Alien, 
Volume XVIII (pp. 98-125). New York, NY: Center for Migration Studies.
Richmond, A.H. Immigrant Adaptation in a Postindustrial Society. In M.M. Kritz, C.B. 
Keely & S.M. Tomasi (Eds.), Global Trends in Migration: Theory and Research on International 
Population Movements (pp. 298-319). Staten Island, NY: Center for Migration Studies.
Shim, J.K. & Siegel, J.G. (1995). Dictionary o f  Economic Terms. New York, NY: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Shyrock, H.S., J.S. Siegel & Associates. (1980). The Methods and M aterials o f  
Demography, Vol. 1. Washington, DC: United States Department of Commerce.
Social, Educational Research and Development, Inc. (SERD). (1968). Aliens in the United 
States Virgin Islands: Workers in a Permanent Economy. Silver Spring, MD.
Social, Educational Research and Development, Inc. (SERD). (1969). A Profile and Plans 
fo r  the Temporary Alien Worker Programme in the United States Virgin Islands. Silver Spring, MD.
Stark, O. (1993). The Migration o f  Labor. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Stubbs, E. ( 1994). The Impact o f  Haitian Students on Educational Cost in Ministry Schools 
Within the Commonwealth o f  the Bahamas: 1991. Ministry of Education, Nassau, Bahamas.
Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law [SICIL] (House Judiciary 
Committee). (1975). Nonimmigrant Alien Labor Programme on the Virgin Islands o f  the United 
States (94th Congress, First Session). Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.
UNDP. (1994). “Labour Migration in Aruba 1986-1993: A Descriptive Review of the Main 
Social Impacts” . No. 93/11. Directorate o f Social Affairs, Aruba.
US Immigration and Naturalization Service. (1994). 1993 Statistical Yearbook o f  the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing 
Office.
Virgin Islands Department o f Health. (1980, 1989, 1990). Virgin Islands Vital Statistics. 
Saint Thomas, VI: Bureau o f Health Statistics, Government of the Virgin Islands.
55
William, M.A. (1995). The Haitian Impact on the Bahamian Education System. Paper 
presented at the twentieth Annual Conference of the Caribbean Studies Association, Curacao, 
Netherlands Antilles.
Wolchok, C. (1996). Immigration Policy: Implications for Public Health. In Tomasi, L.F. 
(Ed.), In Defense o f  the Alien, Volume XVIII (pp. 134-147). New York, NY : Center for Migration 
Studies.
Wyatt, P.C. (1995). Experience o f  an Emigrant on the Island o f  Saint Maarten. Paper 
presented at the twentieth Annual Conference o f the Caribbean Studies Association, Curacao, 
Netherlands Antilles.
/
